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"'All parties involved and society as a whole' would have benefitted had the 
public been allowed to participate in the review process ofthe Superferry project, 
as was envisioned by the legislature when it enacted the Hawai'i Environmental 
Policy ACt.,,1 
At first blush, the Hawai'i Supreme Court's environmental review 
jurisprudence under the leadership of Chief Justice Ronald T. Y. Moon-twelve 
major decisions from 1993 until 20 1 O-appears "pro-environmental" in terms 
of the classic "environment versus development" paradigm. In eight of those 
decisions,2 the citizens challenging state or county agencies for evading the 
public review process required by Hawai'i Revised Statutes (H.R.S.) chapter 
3433 won major, sometimes stunning, victories. On deeper examination of all 
twelve cases,4 however, the environmental review jurisprudence of the Moon 
• Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Professor, and former Director of the 
Environmental Law Program at the William S. Richardson School of Law, University of 
Hawai'i (UH) at Miinoa. The author dedicates this article to her UH colleague Peter Rappa, 
who devoted three decades of professional service to studying and improving chapter 343 and 
co-authored three major studies on chapter 343, including one with this author. See infra note 
16. To his colleagues' sorrow, the irrepressible Peter passed away on May 9, 2011. 
I Sierra Club v. Dep't of Transp. (Superferry I), 115 Haw. 299, 343, 167 P.3d 292, 336 
(2007) (quoting HAW. REV. STAT. § 343-1 (1993)). 
2 Unite Here! Local 5 v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu (Turtle Bay), 123 Haw. 150,231 P.3d 
423 (2010); Sierra Club v. Dep't of Transp. (Superferry II), 120 Haw. 181,202 P.3d 1226 
(2009); Superferry I, 115 Haw. 299, 167 P.3d 292; Sierra Club v. State Office of Planning (Koa 
Ridge), 109 Haw. 411, 126 P.3d 1098 (2006); Kepo'o v. Kane (Kepo '0 II), 106 Haw. 270, 103 
P.2d 939 (2005); Citizens for the Prot. of the N. Kohala Coastline v. Cnty. of Hawai'i (North 
Kohala), 91 Haw. 94, 979 P.2d 1120 (1999); Kepo'o v. Watson (Kepo '0 I), 87 Haw. 91,952 
P.2d 379 (1998); Kahana Sunset Owners Ass'n v. Cnty. ofMaui, 86 Haw. 66,947 P.2d 378 
(1997). 
3 The court and many practitioners often refer to H.R.S. chapter 343 as "HEPA," an 
acronym for the "Hawaii Environmental Policy Act," because the law is one part ofHawai'i's 
version of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2006). 
This article uses the technically correct reference "chapter 343" to avoid confusion with the 
other part ofHawai'i's "mini-NEPA," the little-known Hawai'i Revised Statutes chapter 344, 
aptly titled the "State Environmental Policy" Act. 
4 See Part III for a discussion of Sierra Club v. Hawai'i Tourism Authority (HTA), 100 
Haw. 242, 59 P.3d 877 (2002), Nuuanu Valley Ass 'n v. City & County of Honolulu (Nuuanu), 
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Court appears to be concerned less with substantive results than with process, 
focusing on the likely benefits to agencies and all stakeholders of more robust 
public participation, a core value of chapter 343. In its vigorous enforcement of 
chapter 343, the court has identified sensible boundaries to the law, while 
implicitly rejecting objections from the losing agencies (and the private 
developers) about the short-term economic implications of its rulings. The 
court has stayed true to the original intent of the law even when that meant 
squaring off against other branches of state government. Despite the criticism, 
the Hawai'i Supreme Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice Moon, 
maintained its judicial independence and bravely protected public participation 
in the environmental review process. 
Throughout its chapter 343 decisions, the court repeatedly cited the first 
aspirational section of the law, where the Legislature expressly encourages 
public participation,S putting the public at the table alongside agencies and 
applicants in the review process. The twelve key cases discussed in this article 
indicate that the Moon Court's decisions almost uniformly rule in favor of those 
seeking to maintain openness in the governmental processes that protect 
environmental values against arbitrary and capricious agency decision-making, 
particularly when those agencies are reviewing large-scale projects. Plaintiffs 
do not always win, but when an agency abruptly or unfairly cut off a potentially 
beneficial process for a large-impact project, the court reacted strongly. As the 
court lamented in the 2007 case, Sierra Club v. Department of Transportation 
(Superferry I), "[ c ]ontrary to the expressly stated purpose and intent of[ chapter 
343], the public was prevented from participating in an environmental review 
119 Haw. 90, 194 P.3d 531 (2008), Price v. Obayashi Hawaii Corp., 81 Haw. 171,914 P.2d 
1364 (1996), and Morimoto v. Board of Land & Natural Resources, 107 Haw. 296,113 P.3d 
172 (2005). 
5 Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 343-1 states: 
The legislature finds that the quality of humanity's environment is critical to humanity's 
well being, that humanity's activities have broad and profound effects upon the 
interrelations of all components of the environment, and that an environmental review 
process will integrate the review of environmental concerns with existing planning 
processes ofthe State and counties and alert decision makers to significant environmental 
effects which may result from the implementation of certain actions. The legislature 
further finds that the process of reviewing environmental effects is desirable because 
environmental consciousness is enhanced, cooperation and coordination are encouraged, 
and public participation during the review process benefits all parties involved and society 
as a whole. It is the purpose ofthis chapter to establish a system of environmental review 
which will ensure that environmental concerns are given appropriate consideration in 
decision making along with economic and technical considerations. 
HAw. REv. STAT. § 343-1 (2010). 
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process[,]"6 and their participation would have benefitted "[a] II parties involved 
and society as whole.,,7 
This article reviews the environmental review jurisprudence of the Moon 
Court along a theoretical spectrum of "beneficial public participation." Part I 
presents a brief background on chapter 343 litigation in Hawai'i. Part II 
discusses the eight cases where the court expressed most strongly that citizens' 
lack of participation hanned the public interest in, and the integrity of, the 
environmental review process; this part focuses on three "blockbuster" cases: 
Kahana Sunset,8 Superferry f and Superferry II,IO and Turtle Bay. II Part III 
examines the two decisions where the court tipped the public benefit versus the 
procedural injury balance in favor of defendants, splitting the court in one case 
(Hawaii Tourism Authorityl2) and setting some boundaries on the reach of 
chapter 343 in the other (Nuuanu I3). Part III also mentions briefly the 
remaining two Moon Court cases, Price v. Obayashi Hawaii Corp.14 and 
Morimoto v. Board of Land and Natural Resources,15 in which quixotic 
individuals, seeking more environmental review against a backdrop of already 
extensive agency review processes, simply lost. 
The legacy of the Moon Court's decisions in this core area of environmental 
law is a ringing endorsement of the fundamental principles enshrined by the 
Hawai'i Legislature in chapter 343 that environmental values must be fully 
considered alongside economic concerns, that citizens playa vital role in giving 
voice to those values as part of pennitting and development reviews, and that 
the role of the judiciary is to enforce the legislature's plain intent. Although 
not without harsh critics among some agencies and members of the 
development community, the Moon Court's decisions provide a cohesive, 
principled, and well-balanced body of jurisprudence in this area that will well 
serve Hawai'i's environment, agencies, responsible applicants, and citizens' 
groups for many years to come. 
6 Superjerry I, 115 Haw. at 343, 167 P.3d at 336. 
7 Id. 
8 Kahana Sunset Owners Ass'n v. Cnty. ofMaui, 86 Haw. 66, 947 P.2d 378 (1997). 
9 115 Haw. 299, 167 P.3d 292. 
10 120 Haw. 181,202 P.3d 1226 (2009). 
11 Unite Here! LocalS v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu (Turtle Bay), 123 Haw. 150,231 P.3d 
423 (2010). 
12 Sierra Club v. Haw. Tourism Auth. (HTA), 100 Haw. 242, 59 P.3d 877 (2002). 
\3 Nuuanu Valley Ass'n v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu (Nuuanu), 119 Haw. 90, 194 P.3d 53 I 
(2008). 
14 81 Haw. 171,914 P.2d 1364 (1996). 
15 107 Haw. 296,113 P.3d 172 (2005). 
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I. BACKGROUND OF CHAPTER 343 LITIGATION IN HAWAI'I 
Since the Legislature's enactment of chapter 343 in the early 1970s,16 
Hawai'i state courts have played an important role in the environmental review 
process by interpreting the statute and its administrative rules in the context of 
lawsuits brought by citizens challenging a variety of state and county agency 
determinations. Although procedural in nature, chapter 343 is an action-
forcing statute requiring agencies and applicants to consider at the earliest stage 
the environmental effects of certain proposals for action, projects, or 
development. 
Chapter 343 requires that an "action" that proposes to "use state or county 
lands or funds" or meets certain other land use or environmental "triggers" 
undergo a public review that can involve two basic steps and may last months 
or a few years. 17 First, the agency prepares a preliminary screening document 
called an Environmental Assessment (EA). Then, if the environmental impacts 
are likely to be significant, the applicants must prepare an Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS), a more comprehensive and usually much longer 
analysis that examines the potential impacts, as well as project alternatives, in 
greater depth. If the state or county agency accepts the final EA or EIS, that 
analysis is supposed to inform the agency's decision-making on subsequent 
substantive approvals, such as a zoning change or a permit sought under 
another law. Chapter 343 itself does not require an agency to select the most 
environmentally benign alternative; rather, it requires agencies to take a "hard 
look,,18 at the information and give it serious consideration. 
When that review system breaks down, chapter 343 provides for a back-end 
enforcement system of judicial review and lawsuits by "persons aggrieved.,,19 
16 For a comprehensive analysis of chapter 343 and its companion laws, chapter 341 and 
chapter 344, see the series ofthree reports prepared by the University ofHawai'i for the State of 
Hawai'i since 1978: DOAK Cox, PETER RAPPA & JACQUELIN MILLER, THE HAWAII STATE 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT SYSTEM: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION (1978); PETER 
RAPPA, JACQUELINE MILLER & C. COOK, THE HAWAII STATE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
STATEMENT SYSTEM: REVIEW AND RECOMMENDED IMPROVEMENTS (1991); and KARL KIM, 
DENISE ANTOLINI, PETER RAPPA, SCOTT GLENN & NICOLE loWEN, FINAL REpORT ON HAWAII'S 
ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW SYSTEM (20 I 0) [hereinafter KIM, ANTOLINI & RAPPA]. 
17 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 343-5(a)(1)-(9) (201 O)(listing what are commonly known as the 
"triggers"); id § 343-5(b)-(c) (describing the two-step environmental assessment and impact 
statement system). 
18 The "hard look" doctrine, well known under NEP A case law, is also consistently applied 
by the Hawai'i courts to chapter 343 cases. See, e.g., Supeiferry I, 115 Haw. 299, 342, 167 
P.3d 292,335 (2007) (citing Price, 81 Haw. at 182 n.12, 914 P.2d at 1375 n.12 (citation 
omitted)). 
19 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 343-7(a) and (b) addressing the lack of an EA or the failure to 
proceed from an EA to an EIS, respectively, providing: "The councilor office, any agency 
responsible for approval ofthe action, or the applicant shall be adjudged an aggrieved party for 
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In fact, one explanation for the wealth ofHawai'i Supreme Court chapter 343 
decisions focusing on public participation is that, for citizens' groups, there are 
no alternatives to judicial review, no administrative remedies to exhaust,20 and 
no one with authoritY 1 to listen to and resolve complaints of citizens seeking to 
enforce the law.22 The other reason is that none of the other four kinds of 
potential plaintiffs-applicants, agencies, the Office of Environmental Quality 
Control (OEQC), or the Environmental Council-has evec3 sought a judicial 
remedy to enforce chapter 343. Approving agencies nevec4 reject exemption 
declarations, EAs, or EISs. Thus, only citizens have sued. Not surprisingly, 
the purposes of bringing judicial action under this subsection. Others, by court action, may be 
adjudged aggrieved." Section 343-7(c), covering challenges to an E1S, provides a slightly 
modified standing platform for plaintiffs, limiting it to the council and to those who commented 
on the draft EIS and to the scope ofthose comments. 
20 Only applicants whose final E1S is rejected by the approving agency may seek review 
from the Environmental Council. HAW. REV. STAT. § 343-5(c). The author is unaware of any 
situation where an agency rejected a final EIS and that non-acceptance was appealed to the 
Council. 
21 Since 1985, the Environmental Council rules have provided for a declaratory order 
process. See HAW. CODER. § 11-201-21 to -25 (LexisNexis 2011). When the author served on 
the council from 2004 to 2006, the Attorney General's Office advised the council repeatedly 
that it had no declaratory order authority based on the Attorney General's prior opinions and a 
report by the Legislative Reference Bureau, DECLARATORY RULINGS AND TIIE ENVIRONMENTAL 
COUNCIL (1989). Therefore, in 2006, the Council proposed to delete this section of its rules 
pending legislative clarification. Governor Lingle never approved the Council's proposed rules 
for public hearings; thus the current Council rules (somewhat ironically) suggest that such 
quasi-judicial authority exists when the Attorney General takes the position that it does not. 
22 During this author's term of service on the Council, it heard citizen complaints several 
times but, due to the lack of any advisory opinion, declaratory order, or other authority, was 
unable to do anything more than write a letter expressing concern to the agencies involved. 
Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 341-6 provides: "The council shall serve as a liaison between 
the director and the general public by soliciting information, opinions, complaints, 
recommendations, and advice concerning ecology and environmental quality through public 
hearings or any other means and by publicizing such matters as requested by the director 
pursuant to section 341-4(b )(3)." Whether to modify the legal authority ofthe council was one 
issue examined in the 20 I 0 University of Hawai 'i study for the legislature. KIM, ANTOLIN[ & 
RAPPA, supra note 16. 
23 The author is unaware of any such case, and no such case appears in the reported case 
law. 
24 The only well-known situation in Hawai'i ofa rejected EIS involved the 1999 decision 
by Tim Johns, then-director of the State Department of Land and Natural Resources, who 
rejected an EIS by Hawaiian Electric Company for the Wa'ahila Ridge transmission project, 
which engendered thousands of public comments. Director Johns later accepted the EIS, but the 
agency voted to deny the Conservation District Use Permit in 2002, and the project was 
ultimately shelved. See Malama 0 Manoa, Historic Preservation, 
http://my.malamaomanoa.org/preservation (last visited Apr. 3, 2011). 
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then, the case law in this area focuses heavily on removing the barriers to 
public participation and ensuring the adequacy of the agency process. 
Across nearly four decades of chapter 343 litigation, Hawai'i appellate courts 
have issued approximately twenty-three noteworthy decisions: twenty by the 
Hawai'i Supreme Court and three by the Hawai'i Intermediate Court of 
Appeals (ICA).25 Twelve, more than half of those decisions, were issued 
during the 1993-2010 term of the Moon Court. Those cases dominated the 
court's environmental docket, keeping these issues at the forefront of 
environmental law in Hawai'i and shaping current stakeholder and public 
perception about the importance and reach ofthis fundamental environmental 
law. 
The Hawai'i Supreme Court and ICA have repeatedly grounded their 
decisions in the four key principles of the state environmental review system: 
(1) the broad purpose and intent of chapter 343 to protect environmental 
quality, (2) the "informational role" of the environmental review process, (3) 
the value of public participation, and (4) the goal of improving the quality of 
agency decision-making. Despite the clamor among agencies and applicants 
for more efficiency, clarity, and predictability in the law, these values are not 
embedded in the law itself. In fact, in several of these chapter 343 cases, the 
Hawai'i Supreme Court has made it clear that agencies and developers proceed 
at their peril if they circumvent the environmental review process.26 This is not 
to say the court is unaware of the potential real-world impact of its rulings, but 
rather that the Moon Court has given highest priority to the procedural 
requirements of the law. The court has repeatedly referred to the Legislature's 
strong emphasis on public participation and restricted its judicial role to 
25 In addition to the twelve decisions featured in this article, see supra notes 2 and 4, the 
Hawai'i Supreme Court has rendered seven important chapter 343 cases since 1978: Life of the 
Landv. Ariyoshi, 59 Haw. 156,577 P.2d 1116 (1978); Molokai Homesteaders Ass 'n v. Cobb, 
63 Haw. 453, 629 P.2d 1134 (1981); McGlone v. Inaba, 64 Haw. 27, 636 P.2d 158 (1981); 
Waikiki Resort Hotel, Inc. v. City & County of Honolulu, 63 Haw. 222, 624 P.2d 1353 (1981); 
Waianae Coast Neighborhood Board v. Hawaiian Electric Co., 64 Haw. 126,637 P.2d 776 
(1981); Pearl Ridge Estates CommunityAss'n v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 65 Haw. 133,648 P.2d 702 
(1982); and Mauna Kea Power Co. v. Board of Land & Natural Resources, 76 Haw. 259, 874 
P.2d 1084 (1994). In addition, Ka Pa'akai 0 Ka 'Aina v. Land Use Commission, 94 Haw. 31, 7 
P.3d 1068 (2000), discusses the amendments to chapter 343 that initiated the cultural impact 
statement requirement. The Intermediate Court of Appeals decided three notable cases: 
Medeiros v. Hawaii County PlanningAss'n, 8 Haw. App. 183,797 P.2d 59 (1990); Bremnerv. 
City & County of Honolulu, 96 Haw. 134,28 P.3d 350 (App. 2001); and 'Ohana Pale KeAo v. 
Board of Agriculture, 118 Haw. 247,188 P.3d 761 (App. 2008). 
26 See Supeiferry I, 115 Haw. 299, 167 P.3d 292 (2007) (stopping the $40 million state 
harbor improvements project, as well as the Superferry's operations, for lack of chapter 343 
compliance); see also Kepo '0 II, 106 Haw. 270,103 P.3d 939 (2005) (rejecting the defendants' 
argument that voiding a six-year-old lease deprived them of a vested property right or due 
process). 
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interpreting the plain language of the law. In essence, the court has let the 
economic chips fall where they may, leaving those policy choices to the 
Legislature. 27 
In slicing up the Moon Court's chapter 343 decisions, it is helpful to keep in 
mind the four basic types of environmental review cases: (1) failure to prepare 
(or require) an EA/8 (2) failure to prepare (or require) an EIS;29 (3) agency 
acceptance of an insufficient EIS;30 and (4) failure to require a supplemental 
EA or EIS.31 From the perspective of citizens' groups, the first two types of 
cases are easier to win. The third type can be quite difficult, and in Hawai'i, 
the fourth has been successful at least once but is still novel. Perhaps more 
importantly for this article's focus on public participation, the cases in which 
the court is most likely to perceive the biggest injustice that merits judicial 
intervention are the first two--when the agency stiff-arms citizens' groups and 
27 Amending chapter 343 has often been the topic of legislative debate. The University of 
Hawai'i study and a legislative working group formed by Senator Mike Gabbard during the 
2010 session proposed an omnibus bill to modernize the law, but that bill was not introduced in 
the 2011 session. For the history ofthat process, see Assessing Hawaii's Environmental Review 
Process, http://hawaiieisstudy.blogspot.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2011). During the 2011 
session, the only major chapter 343 bills to make it to conference (and then die due to unrelated 
procedural reasons) were Senate Bill 699, a proposal to strengthen the OEQC by allowing the 
office to assess fees on filed documents, and Senate Bill 723, the developer and agency-
proposed extension of what is called the "ministerial exemption." 
28 When there is a "lack of assessment required under section 343-5," a lawsuit must be 
filed within 120 days of "the agency's decision to carry out or approve the action" or, if the 
agency has made no formal determination, within 120 days after the project has started. HAw. 
REv. STAT. § 343-7(a) (2010). 
29 If an EIS is not prepared when one "is required" and the process stops at only an 
EAlFinding of No Significant Impact (FONSI), then an action must be brought within thirty 
days after the public has been informed of that decision. Id. § 343-7(b). 
30 An "adequacy" challenge must be brought within sixty days after public notice of the 
acceptance ofan EIS. Id. § 343-7(c). These timing restrictions (called "limitation of actions" 
under chapter 343) act as an important screen for timely litigation. Failure to meet these 
requirements has barred several citizen claims. See, e.g., Waikiki Resort Hotel, Inc., 63 Haw. 
222, 624 P.2d 1353; Waianae Coast Neighborhood Board, 64 Haw. 126, 637 P.2d 776; 
Medeiros, 8 Haw. App. 183,797 P.2d 59; Bremner, 96 Haw. 134,28 P.3d 350. C!UniteHere! 
Local 5 v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu (Turtle Bay), 123 Haw. 150, 181,231 P.3d 423,454 
(2010) (finding plaintiffs met the statute oflimitations, adopting the more generous 120-day 
period of -7(a), running from the date of the City and County of Honolulu Department of 
Planning and Permitting (DPP) approval of the subdivision application). 
31 Chapter 343 itself does not address supplemental documents, but the Environmental 
Council's rules expressly do. HAW. CODER. §§ 11-200-26, -27 (LexisNexis 2011). Thecourt 
specifically upheld the Council's rulemaking authority regarding supplemental documents in the 
Turtle Bay case. See Turtle Bay, 123 Haw. at 176, 231 P.3d at 499 ("[nhe rule-making 
authority expressly grants to the Environmental Council the power to promulgate rules 
regarding EISs."). 
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either denies that chapter 343 applies at all, or determines that only an EA (and 
not a full EIS) is warranted by the proposed action. 
The unusual commitment of citizens' groups in pursuing these cases and the 
summary judgment nature of this type of litigation (which tends to minimize 
costs and maximize the ability to characterize issues for appeal as "oflaw" and 
not "of fact") has meant that almost all chapter 343 cases filed in circuit court 
have eventually made their way to the Hawai' i Supreme Court.32 Thus, oddly 
enough, an examination of the Hawai'i Supreme Court decisions does reflect 
the in-the-trenches battles over chapter 343 actions by agencies and applicants 
in Hawai' i. 33 The Moon Court era decisions discussed next, seen from the 
perspective of a theory of beneficial public participation, represent a striking 
body of case law in their inclination to throw open the courthouse doors to 
responsible citizens' groups even when it means stopping high-profile 
development projects. 
II. ENSURING JUDICIAL ACCESS WHEN CITIZENS' LACK OF P ARTICIP A TION 
HARMED THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW PROCESS 
The Moon Court's environmental review decisions have strongly ensured 
open access to the courts when citizens' lack of participation has, in the court's 
view, harmed the public interest role that the Legislature built into the 
environmental review process. This section reviews eight decisions of the court 
in chronological rather than thematic order to create a cumulative 
understanding of "why plaintiffs win so often" across nearly two decades of 
decisions. This section also highlights the three "game-changing" 
environmental review rulings of the Moon Court: Kahana Sunset Owners 
Association v. County of Maui,34 the Superferry is and Superferry II36 cases, 
and Unite Here! Local 5 v. City and County of Honolulu (Turtle Bay).37 Each 
of these major decisions not only had David and Goliath qualities, but all three 
32 In the author's experience, only one chapter 343 case of recent note has not reached the 
Hawai'i Supreme Court. See 'OhanaPale KeAo v. Bd. ofAgric., 118 Haw. 247,188 P.3d 761 
(App. 2008) (finding that chapter 343 review was required for importation of genetically 
modified algae by a private company to a state research facility). 
33 This is not to say that citizens sue every time they are concerned about the inadequacy of 
an EA or EIS; citizens' groups often decline to sue because ofa variety offactors, such as lack 
of available counsel, high costs and attorneys' fees, political concerns, internal disagreement, or 
poor timing. Because the only way to challenge a flawed chapter 343 decision is to sue, 
however, there is no "bottom ofthe pyramid" for these kinds of cases, and citizens rarely settle 
at the circuit court level because of the important legal issues and projects involved. 
34 86 Haw. 66,947 P.2d 378 (1997). 
35 115 Haw. 299, 167 P.3d 292 (2007). 
36 120 Haw. 181,202 P.3d 1226 (2009). 
37 123 Haw. 150,231 P.3d 423 (2010). 
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contained numerous progressive rulings on public participation that boldly 
reinforced the citizen lawsuit paradigm. 
A. Kahana Sunset: Shaping the Broad Funnel of the Applicability of 
Chapter 343 
In the world of chapter 343 litigation, few issues are more important than the 
threshold question of when the law applies. Divining the precise initial reach 
of the law consumes much energy in the daily life of consultants, project 
proponents, agencies, and citizen groups. Prognostication is made 
simultaneously more-and less-predictable by the structure of the "343 
funnel," which is very wide at the top and then rapidly narrowed by an 
exemption process. 38 At the top, the chapter 343 review process is deliberately 
broad: it requires an EA for actions that "[p ]ropose the use of state or county 
lands or the use of state or county funds.,,39 Following that large initial "big 
trigger," chapter 343 lists twelve other circumstances that require 
environmental review.40 Kahana Sunset Owners Association v. County of 
Maui41 addressed the breadth of this critical "use" trigger and set the stage for a 
38 Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 343-6(a)(2) gives the State Environmental Council the 
authority to promulgate regulations that exempt "specific types of actions, because they will 
probably have minimal or no significant effects on the environment." The exemption 
regulations, Hawai'i Administrative Rules section 11-200-8, provide for eleven "classes" of 
exempt actions and a "safety net" exception. HAw. CODE R. § 11-200-8(a)-(b) (LexisNexis 
2011). The agencies maintain "lists" of exemption actions posted on the OEQC web site and in 
theory the actions are periodically updated and reviewed by the Environmental Council. Jd. § 
11-200-8( d). Agencies are then allowed to "declare" certain action exempt from chapter 343; 
they must "maintain records" and "produce the records for review upon request." [d. § 11-200-
8( e). Unfortunately, this very important declaration process is not transparent, except for the 
release of a few high-profile exemption declarations such as was challenged in Superjerry; 
therefore it is not known how many actions are declared exempt each year by state and county 
agencies or if those declarations comport with the law. For this reason, a recent University of 
Hawai'i study proposed to create a new transparent declaration accounting system. See KIM, 
ANTOLINI & RAPPA, supra note 16, at 60. 
39 HAw. REv. STAT. § 343-5(a)(I) (2010). 
40 Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 343-5(a) lists twelve other triggers for environmental 
review, including, "use within any land classified as a conservation district," id. § 343-5(a)(2); 
"use within a shoreline area," id. § 343-5(a)(3); "use within any historic site," id. § 343-5(a)(4); 
"use within the Waikiki ... [) Special District," id. § 343-5(a)(5); "amendments to existing 
county general plans" that propose urbanization, id. § 343-5(a)(6); "reclassification of ... a 
conservation district by the state land use commission," id. § 343-5(a)(7); certain new or 
expanded helicopter facilities, id. § 343-5(a)(8); certain large wastewater treatment units, id. § 
343-5(a)(9)(A); a waste-to-energy facility, id. § 343-5(a)(9)(B); a landfill, id. § 343-5(a)(9)(C); 
an oil refinery, id. § 343-5(a)(9)(D); or a power-generating facility. !d. § 343-5(a)(9)(E). 
41 86 Haw. 66,947 P.2d 378 (1997). 
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series of cases from the court that reinforced the broad shape of the funnel and 
sparked a backlash from the development community that continues today. 
Kahana Sunset was not the first case to define the line between what is 
covered and what is excluded42 or exempt from chapter 343. In McGlone v. 
Inaba, decided in 1981 during the Richardson Court era, the court upheld the 
Board of Land and Natural Resources' (BLNR) decision not to require an EA 
for an underground utility easement through conservation land or for an 
adjacent single-family residence in Hawai'i Kai, reasoning that the impacts did 
not rise to the level of significance contemplated by chapter 343 and, therefore, 
that BLNR had properly exempted the project.43 The plaintiffs-six 
individuals "interested in the preservation of the environment at Paiko Lagoon, 
Kuliouou, Oahu," represented by Jack Schweigert44 -lost. The Richardson 
Court seemed persuaded by three major factors (factors not present in Kahana 
Sunset and its progeny): the project involved a single-family residence; the 
Environmental Council's exemption regulations expressly included single-
family residences and supporting utilities;45 and the projected impact on Paiko 
pond was minima1.46 The court held that "significant effect" is a "relative 
concept" and that any determination of significant effect is "highly 
subjective.'.47 At the same time, an agency "must consider every phase and 
every expected consequence of the proposed action" when assessing potential 
significant effects.48 
The facts in the 1997 Kahana Sunset case were readily distinguishable from 
McGlone. In Kahana Sunset, Justice Paula Nakayama, writing for a unanimous 
court, agreed with the citizen-plaintiff Kahana Sunset Owners Association (not 
joined by any environmental group but represented by Isaac Hall, a prominent 
environmental attorney on Maui and chapter 343 expert49) that the Maui 
County Planning Commission had erred in not requiring an EA for a proposal 
42 "Excluded" means something different than "exempt." Under Hawai'i law, the former 
indicates that the law does not apply at all; the latter indicates that the law applies but that the 
project falls under the class of exemptions provided under the rules. See HAw. CODE R. § 11-
200-8 (LexisNexis 2011). Under federal law, the term used in the Council on Environmental 
Quality Control's NEPA regulations is "excluded." See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2011). 
43 64 Haw. 27, 38, 636 P.2d 158, 166-67 (1981). 
44 Id. at 28,636 P.2d at 160. 
45 Id. at 36,636 P.2d at 165 (citing EIS Regs. 1 :33(a)(3)[2][d] (currently HAW. CODE R. § 
11-200-8(a)(3) (LexisNexis 2011))). 
46 The court explained that "the effect of the construction of underground utilities on Lot 
715~esignated the primary impact-would only be minimal and temporary. There is ample 
evidence to support this finding." Id. at 37,636 P.2d at 165. 
47 Id. at 35,636 P.2d at 164. 
48 Id. 
49 Kahana Sunset Owners Ass'n v. Cnty. of Maui, 86 Haw. 66, 67, 947 P.2d 378, 379 
(1997). 
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to build 312 multi-family units that required a thirty-six-inch drainage culvert 
to be tunneled under a street and then connected to a culvert under a public 
highway. 50 The court found that the agency's decision was inconsistent with 
the intent of chapter 343 to "exempt only very minor projects" as well as the 
"letter and intent ofthe administrative regulations.,,51 
Addressing the merits, Justice Nakayama first reviewed the purpose and 
general provisions ofHEPA,52 quoting the entire first section of section 343-
1,53 which includes the legislative findings emphasizing the role of public 
participation. She explained the broad reach of chapter 343: an EA is 
mandatory unless a project is exempt, and an EA must be prepared at the 
"earliest practicable time.,,54 Justice Nakayama noted that it was "undisputed" 
that the housing complex would install a new thirty-six-inch drainage line 
beneath Napilihau Street and then connect to an existing twenty-four-inch 
culvert beneath Lower Honoapi'ilani Highway.55 In the court's view, this was 
a "use of state or county lands or funds" under H.R.S. section 343-5(a)(1).56 
The opinion then examined the County's claimed exemption for "minor 
accessory structures" and certain utilities, 57 finding that the project probably did 
not fall under the exemptions in Hawai'i Administrative Rules (HAR) section 
11-200-8. 58 Stating that the administrative rules intended to exempt "only very 
minor projects from the ambit ofHEPA,,,59 the court found that the exemption 
was "inconsistent with both the letter and intent of the administrative 
regulations. ,,60 
50 Id. at 71-72,947 P.2d at 383-84. The Kahana Sunset case began in 1991 when the 
developer filed for a special management area (SMA) permit for the Napilihau Villages 
development. ld. at 68, 947 P .2d at 380. In 1993, the Maui County Planning Commission held 
a public hearing and granted the homeowners' motion to intervene. ld. In 1994, the 
Commission held a contested case hearing that lasted thirteen days. ld. In 1995, the 
Commission granted the SMA permit, finding that no EA was required for the project. Id. The 
homeowners appealed to circuit court, which affirmed the Commission's order, and then to the 
Hawai'i Supreme Court. ld. Thus, seven years passed while the parties battled in court over 
whether an EA, which could have taken much less time to complete, would be required. 
51 Id. at 72, 947 P.2d at 384. 
52 Id. at 70-71, 947 P.2d at 382-83. 
53 Id. at 70, 947 P.2d at 382. 
54 Id. at 71, 947 P.2d at 383 (quoting HAW. REv. STAT. § 343-5(c) (1993». 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. The Commission relied on Hawai'i Administrative Rules section 11-22-8(a)(6), 
"construction of placement of minor structures accessory to existing facilities," and an agency 
exemption list that covered "drains, sewers, and waterlines within streets or highways." ld. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 72, 947 P.2d at 384. 
60 Id. 
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Justice Nakayama concluded by reviewing the purposes of an EA, noting 
that the document gives the agency and the public information necessary to 
evaluate environmental effects.61 She also noted the importance of public 
notice and comment in that process: "The public comment and notification 
provisions ofHEPA underscore the legislative intent to provide broad-reaching 
dissemination of proposed projects so that the public may be allowed an 
opportunity to comment and the agency will have the necessary information to 
understand the potential environmental ramifications of their decisions. ,,62 She 
continued: "[I]n the absence ofthe preliminary environmental assessment, the 
legislative intent that potential effects be studied and the public notified is 
undercut.,,63 The vigor of the court's conclusion was supported by a little-
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. The court also found that, pursuant to H.R.S. section 343-7( a), the plaintiff properly 
brought the action within 120 days of the Maui County Planning Commission's decision to 
approve the special management area (SMA) permit. Id. at 73, 947 P.2d at 385. 
A key but sleeper holding in Kahana Sunset involved what is known as the "functional 
equivalence doctrine," often argued by defendants in NEP A cases, also known as the 
Portland/Weyerhaeuser doctrine (from Portland Cement Ass 'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 
(D.C. Cir. 1973), and Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978». Maui 
County claimed that chapter 343 was essentially redundant because the similar SMA review 
process under Hawai'i Revised Statutes chapter 205 was the "functional equivalent." Kahana 
Sunset, 86 Haw. at 73-74, 947 P.2d at 385-86. The court had previously rejected that theory 
only indirectly in Pearl Ridge Estates v. Lear Siegler, Inc., in which it held that the State Land 
Use Commission was required to conduct an EA for a boundary amendment to rezone 8.4 acres 
from conservation to urban, even though the appellant had participated in a contested case 
hearing. [d. The Kahana Sunset court expressly rejected this functional equivalence argument, 
finding that chapter 343 "contains a fixed scheme of public notice," and that the county's 
argument improperly shifted the burden of conducting required review and studies from the 
applicant to the public. Id. at 73, 947 P.2d at 385. 
A few years later, in Sierra Club v. State Office of Planning (Koa Ridge), 109 Haw. 411, 
126 P.3d 1098 (2006), however, the Hawai'i Supreme Court seemed to leave the door ajar for a 
future case that may satisty the criteria for functional equivalence. The court noted, "[o)n the 
record before us, we cannot accept this 'functional equivalent of a required EA argument. '" Id. 
at 420, 126 P.3d at 1107. Thus, with sufficient findings that support equivalence, an agency 
might be able to satisty chapter 343 review with a different environmental review procedure. 
On the other hand, even more recently, in 'Ohana Pale Ke Ao v. Board of Agriculture, 118 
Haw. 247, 188 P.3d 761 (App. 2008), the Intermediate Court of Appeals rejected the argument. 
The State contended that its process for reviewing algae importation permits under chapter 
150A "establishes a comprehensive and exclusive process for the issuance of permits for 
importing microorganisms and vests in the Board the sole authority to regulate the import of 
microorganisms." Id. at 253, 188 P.3d at 767. The State claimed the chapter 150A process 
included the "essential components ofthe HEP A review process."!d. The court rejected this 
argument, finding that, even if the Board of Agriculture had exclusive authority under chapter 
150A, "HRS § 343-5 plainly and unambiguously required preparation of an EA before the 
Board could approve Mera's application" and that "the requirements ofHRS Chapter 343 were 
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noticed observation that the County admitted on appeal-that the lack of an EA 
"might be error.,,64 Ultimately, the court vacated the Commission's granting of 
the special management area (SMA) permit to the developer and remanded the 
case. 
Kahana Sunset deserves blockbuster status not because the legal ruling is out 
ofline with the statutes or prior case law-it is not. Rather, the case constitutes 
a ringing endorsement of the chapter 343 process and citizen participation even 
though the 312-unit Napilihau development had already received its SMA 
permit from the County. The public participation requirements trumped 
economic considerations. Moreover, the court's ruling in this case set up a 
strong foundation for two more "state or county lands or funds" cases in the 
trilogy-North Kohala and Koa Ridge, discussed below-further reinforcing 
the strict process requirements of chapter 343 to the distinct disadvantage of 
developers who failed to follow the extra steps involved in the EA and EIS 
review process. Kahana Sunset had the perfect plaintiff to set up good case law 
for future "use" cases.65 A private homeowners group looking to protect their 
property values is a sympathetic plaintiff even for conservative judges. The 
group was a far cry from the rabble-rousing environmental groups who would 
pick up this case as a sword shortly thereafter. 
B. Kepo'o I and Kepo'o II 
Over the next seven years, the Hawai'i Supreme Court issued two more 
decisions that followed the principles of Kahana Sunset. In Kepo '0 v. Watson 
intended to be 'integrated' with and to supplement decision-making by agencies involved in a 
permitting process." 1d. Because it represents a large potential avoidance strategy for SMA 
applicants and county agencies, the issue is likely to be brought to the Hawai'i Supreme Court 
again in the future. 
64 Kahana Sunset, 86 Haw. at 72, 947 P.2d at 384. Two other key findings in Kahana 
Sunset outside of the scope of this article are: (l) the EA must address the environmental effects 
of the entire proposal, not only the drainage system (which has "no independent utility"), 
because it is a "necessary precedent" to the development; otherwise it would be "improper 
segmentation"; and (2) the lead agency has the responsibility to prepare the EA and cannot defer 
that process to another agency with downstream authority. Jd. at 74-75,947 P.2d at 386-87. 
65 On the one hand, relatively insignificant private utility connections (as in McGlone v. 
1naba, 64 Haw. 27,636 P.2d 158 (1981), and Nuuanu Valley Association v. City and County of 
Honolulu, 119 Haw. 90, 194 P.3d 531 (2008)) appear not to meet the benchmark; on the other 
hand, tunneling under state highways for major developments projects (Kahana Sunset, 86 Haw. 
66, 947 P .2d 378, Citizens for the Protection of the North Kohala Coastline v. State Office of 
Planning (North Kohala), 91 Haw. 94,979 P.2d 1120 (1999), and Sierra Club v. State Office of 
Planning (Koa Ridge), 109 Haw. 411, 126 P.3d 1098 (2006), importation of genetically 
engineered algaeforresearch at state facilities ('Ohana Pale, 118 Haw. 247, 188 P.3d 761), and 
large capital harbor improvements (Supeiferry 1, 115 Haw. 299, 167 P.3d 292 (2007») do trigger 
the need for review. 
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(Kepo '0 1)66 and Kepo '0 v. Kane (Kepo '0 11),67 the court reinforced its ruling 
that agencies and applicants must carefully follow the constraints of chapter 
343, even when it means holding up major development. Although the cases 
are less earth-shattering than Kahana Sunset, the plaintiffs again were not rag-
tag environmentalists; they were, respectively, individual (pro se) residents and 
a homeowners' association deeply concerned about the economic, social, and 
environmental implications of a state agency's head-long rush into building a 
58-megawatt power plant on the South Kohala coast of the island ofHawai'i. 
1. Kepo'o I: The expansive scope of chapter 343 
In 1998, Justice Mario Ramil wrote the first of the twin Kepo '0 decisions-
Kepo '0 v. Watson (Kepo '0 1)68-regarding the reach of chapter 343 to 
Hawaiian Home Lands under the definition of "state lands." In early 1993, the 
Department of Hawaiian Home Lands (DHHL) completed an EIS for its 
proposed master plan development of 10,000 acres of Hawaiian Home Lands, 
which included a power generating facility.69 In December 1993, DHHL leased 
forty acres to Waimana Enterprises, Inc., which sublet a portion to Kawaihae 
Cogeneration Partners (KCP).70 KCP then prepared an EA for the cogeneration 
power facility, believing the document was required under chapter 343; it 
prepared an EA instead of an EIS in part because DHHL had already completed 
an EIS for the 1 O,OOO-acre area.71 DHHL accepted the EA, finding that an EIS 
was not required.72 Three individual pro se plaintiffs, Arthur F. Kepo'o (who 
died between the first and second decisions), 73 Lillian K. Dela Cruz, and 
Josephine L. Tanimoto sued DHHL.74 Waimana and KCP intervened.75 In the 
circuit court, DHHL and WaimanalKCP sought summary judgment that chapter 
343 did not apply to Hawaiian Home Lands.76 The circuit court disagreed and 
granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the grounds that chapter 
66 87 Haw. 91,952 P.2d 379 (1998). 
67 106 Haw. 270, 103 P.3d 939 (2005). 
68 Kepo '0 1,87 Haw. 91, 952 P.2d 379. 




73 See Kepo '0 II, 106 Haw. 270,274 n.4, 103 P.3d 939, 943 n.4 (2005). 
74 Kepo '0 1,87 Haw. at 91,952 P.2d at 379. 
75 Id. at 93,952 P.2d at 381. 
76 Id. at 94,952 P.2d at 382. 
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343 did apply to Hawaiian Home Lands.77 WaimanalKCP appealed. 78 The 
issue on the first appeal was this question of applicability. 79 
Justice Ramil agreed with the pro se plaintiffs and the amicus curiae, a 
private homeowners' group represented by Cades Schutte Fleming & Wright.80 
Although Hawaiian Home Lands are special trust lands, they are "state lands" 
and thus subject to chapter 343.81 The court also rejected the defendants' 
challenge to the individual plaintiffs' compliance with the statute oflimitations, 
or standing, provisions of chapter 343.82 The court remanded for further 
proceedings to determine if the Hawaiian Homes Commission and the 
developer had complied with chapter 343.83 That remand led to another appeal 
and decision by the court seven years later, more than ten years after the lease 
agreement. 84 
2. Kepo'o II: Chapter 343 trumps a premature state lease, even years later 
With Justice Simeon Acoba writing for a unanimous court, the 2005 Kepo '0 
II decision also favored the plaintiffs.85 The court again upheld the circuit 
court's ruling, this time finding not only that an EIS (not just an EA) was 
required, but also that DHHL's lease with KCP was null and void due to the 
lack of compliance with chapter 343.86 
On this second appeal, the lineup of the parties was stronger. The amicus 
curiae in Kepo '0 I, James Growney and the Mauna Kea Homeowners' 
Association, were no longer just "friends of the court" but now intervening 
plaintiffs.87 The new issues on appeal involved standing,88 the significance 




80 The prominent law finn represented Amici Curiae James Growney and Mauna Kea 
Homeowners' Association. !d. at 93,952 P.2d at 381. 
81 Id. at 98,952 P.2d at 386. The court noted that chapter 343 is part ofthe state's police 
power ("public safety, health, and welfare"), id. at 99,952 P.2d at 387, and although the law 
"does not significantly affect the land," id. at 100,952 P .2d at 388, it requires decision-makers 
to consider environmental impacts in making decisions, and these "procedural and informational 
requirements" are "incidental" to effect on the land, "not inconsistent" with the interests of 
Hawaiian Home beneficiaries. Id. at 102,952 P.2d at 390. 
82 Id. at 95,952 P.2d at 383. 
83 Id. at 93, 952 P.2d at 381. 
84 Kepo'o II, 106 Haw. 270, 103 P.3d 939 (2005). 
85 Id. at 274, 103 P.3d at 943. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 283-84, 103 P.3d at 952-53. 
89 Id. at 274, 103 P.3d at 943. 
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process/takings claim by the developer.9o Justice Acoba held that the individual 
plaintiffs were aggrieved parties even if they did not comment on the draft EA 
because the challenge was brought under Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 343-
7(b) (a determination by an agency that an EIS is not required), not section 343-
7(c), which does require aggrieved parties to have commented on the draft 
EIS.91 He further held that the new intervenors, who filed suit four years after 
DHHL issued the negative declaration, could participate because the original 
lawsuit by the other individuals was timely filed. After reviewing the purpose 
of chapter 343,92 which the court stated required an "extensive environmental 
review process" to determine if the benefit "outweighs any detriment to the 
surrounding community,,,93 Justice Acoba reviewed the circuit court's 
determination that an EIS was required due to the significant effects-such as 
groundwater withdrawal, fuel consumption, and air pollution-from the 58-
megawatt power plant and that it would be a "major source of pollution.,,94 
Addressing an important threshold issue, he held that the word "may" in "may 
have a significant effect on the environment" in chapter 343 had the common 
meaning of "likely,,,95 and that the potential effects from the power plant met 
that definition.96 
Hitting the ball out ofthe park, Justice Acoba then upheld the circuit court's 
decision to void the DHHL lease for the power plant because an EIS was a 
"condition precedent" and DHHL had not completed a final EIS before 
entering into a lease for construction.97 The court found that the legal violation 
effectively placed the lease "on hold" until the agency and applicant complied 
with chapter 343.98 Rejecting the due process and takings claims proffered by 
WaimanalKCP's lawyers (including future Hawai'i Supreme Court Justice 
James E. Duffy, Jr., then a solo attorney), the court held that a lease voided for 
failure to comply with chapter 343, even six years after it was granted, did not 
deprive the leaseholder's property rights.99 Absent chapter 343 compliance, 
DHHL's lease for the project was invalid; thus the project proponents lacked 
the requisite property interest to assert a due process claim or a takings claim. 100 
In summary, Kepo '0 I and Kepo '0 II strongly reinforce the court's earlier 
ruling in Kahana Sunset that chapter 343 has broad reach and must be strictly 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 284-85, 103 P.3d at 953-54. 
92 Id. at 291, 103 P.3d at 960. 
93 Id. at 287, 103 P.3d at 956. 
94 Id. at 288, 103 P.3d at 957. 
95 Id. at 288-89, 103 P.3d at 957-58. 
96 Id. at 290, 103 P.3d at 959. 
97 Id. at 291-92, 103 P .3d at 960-61. 
98 /d. at 292, 103 P.3d at 962. 
99 Id. at 293, 103 P.3d at 962. 
100 Id. 
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followed, even if it means holding up proposed development or-as in the case 
of Kepo '0 II-if it means voiding a six-year-old lease. How do these two cases 
fit into the public benefit theory offered by this article? On the one hand, 
Kepo '0 I and Kepo '0 II initially involved real citizen plaintiffs-Kepo' 0, Dela 
Cruz, and Tanimoto--who started the case pro se, without any apparent support 
from community or environmental groups. On the other hand, by the time 
Kepo '0 I was before the high court, a powerful new ally was on the plaintiffs' 
side: a private homeowners' association with prominent lawyers. This 
additional legal clout undoubtedly changed the quality of the briefing and the 
perceived equities of the issues before the court. Still, Kepo '0 1 and Kepo '011 
fit the theory of public benefit because the court seemed struck by the rashness 
of DHHL's decision to move ahead with a long lease for such a big projeCt 
despite the fairly obvious need to do a full EIS. One can sense from Justice 
Acoba's exhaustive ruling in particular that he smelled a rat in the story about 
how DHHL handled the leasing decision. Thus, the court's conclusion that the 
full EIS process should have been followed, and more public light brought to 
bear on the agency's decision-making, comports with the core notion in chapter 
343 that public process does matter. Two years later, the court revisited similar 
issues, again arising from the pressures for development of the Kohala Coast, in 
Citizens for the Protection of the North Kohala Coastline v. County ofHawai 'i 
(North Kohala).101 
C. North Kohala: The Second Decision in the "Big Trigger" Trilogy 
Rolling the clock back to I 999-two years after Kahana Sunset, one year 
after Kepo '0 1, but six years before Kepo '0 ll-the court's North Kohala lo2 
decision became the second in the renowned trilogy of Hawai 'i's "big trigger" 
cases addressing the applicability of the "use of state or county lands or funds," 
that is, the wide top of the chapter 343 funnel. Writing for a unanimous court, 
Justice Robert Klein held that a resort developer's application to the county for 
an SMA permit for its 387-acre hotel, residential, and golf development 
triggered chapter 343 review because the project proposed two roadways for 
golf carts and maintenance vehicles that would be tunneled under Akoni Pule 
state highway.lo3 Relying on Kahana Sunset, the court reaffirmed that the 
proposed underpasses constituted "use of [s ]tate lands" and were "integral" 
parts of the larger development project.104 
101 91 Haw. 94, 979 P .2d 1120 (1999). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 105, 979 P.2d at 1131. 
104 Id. 
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Similar to Kahana Sunset, the North Kohala case started when the County 
had denied a contested case hearing to Citizens for the Protection of the North 
Kohala Coastline (Citizens) and granted developer Chalon International of 
Hawai'i Inc.' s SMA pennit. 105 In 1993, Citizens challenged the SMA on the 
basis of chapter 343 violations. 106 Judge Ronald Ibarra ruled against 
Citizens, 107 finding that Citizens lacked standing, that an EIS was not required, 
and that the County had properly granted a boundary amendment. 108 
On appeal to the Hawai'i Supreme Court, the case focused on standing, 
"use," and timing. Justice Klein held that Citizens had adequately 
demonstrated standing for a declaratory judgment action under H.R.S. section 
632-1, which is "less stringent" than standing to challenge a denial of a 
contested case hearing. 109 Justice Klein reiterated that in the "realm of 
environmental concerns,,,IlO the court had avoided restricting standing in a 
series of cases. III He found that Citizens had members residing "in close 
proximity" I 12 to the area and who were "long time and frequent users,,113 of the 
coastline affected, even if they were not owners or adjacent owners of the 
project. 114 He concluded that the "needs ofjustice,,115 also supported standing 
and upheld the circuit court's amended standing ruling (that had flipped in 
favor of plaintiffi 16 regarding declaratory and injunctive relief. 117 
Regarding the chapter 343 violations, Justice Klein first held that based on 
Kahana Sunset, the "construction of two underpasses under a state highway 
constitutes use of state land for purposes of HRS 343-5(a)(1)," triggering an 
EIS. 118 The ruling cemented into the law the notion that a substantial physical 
disturbance of state land would constitute "use," lending even more momentum 
105 Id. at 96,979 P.2d at 1122. In 1997, Judge Ibarra upheld the County's SMA decision, 
and the Hawai'i Supreme Court upheld that ruling by summary disposition in 1997. Id. 
106 Id. This chapter 343 challenge was the second lawsuit filed by Citizens. Id. 
107 Id. at 95,979 P.2d at 112l. 
108 Id. at 97,979 P.2d at 1123. Afterthe Hawai'i Supreme Court's decision in Public Access 
Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawai'i County Planning Commission, 79 Haw. 425, 903 P.2d 1246 
(1995), the circuit court changed its ruling on standing, but reaffIrmed its ruling on the other 
issues. North Kohala, 91 Haw. at 97, 979 P.2d at 1123. 
109 North Kohala, 91 Haw. at 100,979 P.2d at 1126. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 101,979 P.2d at 1127. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 101-02, 979 P.2d at 1127-28. 
116 See supra note 108. 
117 North Kohala, 91 Haw. at 101-02,979 P.2d at 1127-28. 
118 Id. at 103, 979 P.2d at 1129. 
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to Kahana Sunset and setting up the future rulings discussed later in this 
article. 1 19 
Second, Justice Klein concluded that it was not too early to prepare the EIS 
given that the underpasses were an "integral" part of the project and that the 
developer had committed to the underpasses, therefore meeting "the earliest 
practicable time" requirement for the EIS.120 He stated that "decisions 
reflecting environmental considerations can most easily be made when other 
basic decisions are also being made, that is, during the early stages of project 
conceptualization and planning.,,121 Therefore, the court remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with the ruling that an EIS was required.122 Overall, the 
decision was a major victory for Citizens-and small "c" citizens-and another 
brick in the wall of Hawai'i Supreme Court cases enforcing a broad 
interpretation of the chapter 343 funnel. 123 
D. Koa Ridge: The Third Decision in the Trilogy 
-
The third decision in the trilogy of major decisions regarding the "use of 
state or county lands" trigger is the 2006 ruling Sierra Club v. State Office of 
Planning, 124 commonly referred to by its place and project name, "Koa Ridge." 
In that case, Justice James Duffy, writing for a unanimous court, upheld First 
Circuit Court Judge Elizabeth Hifo's decision that the State Land Use 
Commission's (LUC) reclassification of 1274 acres in Central O'ahu from 
agriculture to urban-for Castle & Cooke's "Koa Ridge" development-
required at least an EA because the project required tunneling under four state 
highways for a large sewage line and new water 1ines.125 
The massive size and scope of the Koa Ridge development undoubtedly 
helped to persuade the court that the project triggered the environmental review 
process. In 2000, Castle & Cooke and Pacific Health Community, Inc. (PHC) 
petitioned the LUC to amend the land use boundary to allow for the 
119 See Sierra Club v. State Office of Planning (Koa Ridge), 109 Haw. 411,126 P.3d 1098 
(2006). 
120 North Kohala, 91 Haw. at 104-05,979 P.2d at 1130-31 (citing NEPA cases). 
121 Jd. at 105,979 P.2d at 1131. 
122 Id. at 107,979 P.2d at 1133. 
123 The victory was not 100%, however. The court held that "mere impact" on the shoreline 
and conservation areas was not sufficient itself to trigger H.R.S. section 343-5(a)(2) or (a)(3) 
because Chalon's use was not proposed "within" the shoreline area. Id. at 105-06,979 P.2d at 
1131-32. The court also upheld the circuit court orders on the other issues (county code 
compliance and boundary amendment for 14.5 acres). Id. at 107, 979 P.2d at 1133. 
124 109 Haw. 411, 126 P.3d 1098. 
125 Id. at 413, 126 P.3d at 1100. In 2003, Judge Hifo ruled in favor of the Sierra Club, 
vacating the decision of the LUC. Id. at 414, 126 P.3d at 1101. 
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development. 126 The proposed project, still alive today despite substantial 
community opposition,127 consisted of "thousands of homes, a commercial 
center, an elementary school, a park, a church/day care, a recreational center, 
and the Pacific Health Center.,,128 As part of the development, Castle & Cooke 
planned to build a thirty-six-inch pipeline to transmit sewage to the Waipahu 
Sewage Treatment Plant and construct a new water transmission line, both of 
which would require tunneling under Kamehameha Highway, the H-I Freeway, 
the H-2 Freeway, and Farrington Highway, all of which are state land. 129 
In 2001, the Sierra Club asked the LUC to stop processing the boundary 
amendment petition until Castle & Cooke and PHC complied with chapter 343 
because the project would use state lands. 130 In a little-noted portion of the 
record, Castle & Cooke and PHC "admit[ted] that an EA was required but 
argu[ed] that it would be prepared later." 13 1 Thus, the issue became a matter of 
"when," not "whether." With one opposing vote (University of Hawai'i 
environmental law professor M. Casey Jarman, now Leigh), 132 the LUC denied 
the Sierra Club's motion and reclassified 762 acres from agriculture to urban 
without requiring an EA. 133 In 2002, the Sierra Club filed a judicial challenge 
and, in 2003, Judge Hifo ruled in its favor. 134 Only the State Office of 
Planning, a party to the LUC proceeding, appealed to the Supreme Court. 
The key ruling in Koa Ridge focused on the timing of the EA requirement: 
Was the reclassification process "too soon" for kick-starting the chapter 343 
process? The Hawai'i Supreme Court's answer: No. Surprisingly, the case 
has become renowned not for that ruling but for an issue that was not even 
disputed: Was chapter 343 triggered by the development's "use" of the state 
highways? The court's answer: Yes. In fact, the developer admitted that the 
use triggered chapter 343.135 Nonetheless, Justice Duffy examined this 
threshold issue in detail. First, he reviewed the state environmental review 
\26 Id. at 413, 126 P.3d at 1100. 
\27 Andrew Gomes, Koa Ridge Project Given Green Light, HONOLULU STAR-ADVERTISER, 
Sept. 24, 2010, http://www.staradvertiser.comlnewslhawaiinews/20100924_Koa _Ridge_ 
project~iven _green _1 ight.html. 




132 See State Land Use Comm'n, In the Matter of the Petition of Castle & Cooke Homes 
Hawaii, Inc. and Pacific Health Community, Inc. to Amend the Agricultural Land Use District 
Boundary into the Urban District Land Use District, Docket No. AOO-734, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order, June 27, 2002, at 79-80. 
133 Koa Ridge, 109 Haw. at 413, 126 P.3d at 1100. 
\34 Id. at 413-14,126 P.3d at 1100-01. 
\35 Id. at 413, 126 P.3d at 1100. 
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process.136 He then found, without difficulty, that the proposal was an "action" 
by an applicant subject to environmental review. 137 He then concluded thatthe 
project would use state lands, citing North Kohala, which found that the 
proposed construction of two highway underpasses constituted use of state 
lands,138 and Kahana Sunset, where the court held that "construction of the 
sewage and water transmission lines will require tunneling beneath state 
highways.,,\39 Accordingly, Justice Duffy found that "the Project is an action 
that proposes the use of state lands, and an EA that addresses the environmental 
effects of the entire Project is required.,,140 Thus, the decision became the third 
in the "use" trilogy even though this "use by tunneling" issue was only 
jurisprudential road-kill on the way to the court's major ruling about timing. 
The more notable part of Justice Duffy's Koa Ridge decision addressed the 
sometimes tricky issue of the timing of the environmental review process. 141 
The Hawai'i courts have consistently interpreted chapter 343 to require 
environmental review at the "earliest practicable time," relying on the plain 
language of the statute. In Kahana Sunset, the court had emphasized that the 
agency "receiving the request for approval,,142 has the responsibility to prepare 
the EA and could not delegate that process to another agency. 143 In Koa Ridge, 
the developer argued that its reclassification petition to the LUC was too early 
to start the environmental review process. l44 To the contrary, Justice Duffy 
found that early environmental review was consistent with the purpose of 
chapter 343, concluding that the LUC (like the County of Maui in Kahana 
Sunset) was the "receiving" agency with substantial authority over the entire 
project, that it had an important role,145 and that its discretionary approval was 
136 Id. at 415, 126 P.3d at 1102. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. (citing Citizens for the Prot. ofthe N. Kohala Coastline v. Cnty. of Hawai'i (North 
Kohala), 91 Haw. 94, 103,979 P.2d 1120,1129 (1999». 
139 Id. at 416, 126 P.3d at 1103 (citing Kahana Sunset Owners Ass'n v. Cnty. ofMaui, 86 
Haw. 66, 74, 947 P.2d 378, 386 (1997». 
140 Id. 
141 Hawai'i appellate courts have issued four decisions addressing this "timing" issue: Two 
decisions relating to when to prepare the review document (Kahana Sunset, 86 Haw. 66, 947 
P.2d 378, andKoa Ridge, 109 Haw. 411,126 P.3d 1098), one on when to prepare supplemental 
documents (Unite Here! Local 5 v. City & County of Honolulu (Turtle Bay), 123 Haw. 150,231 
P.3d 423 (2010» and, indirectly, one on "tiering," that is, linking, earlier and later review 
documents ('Ohana Pale Ke Ao v. Board of Agriculture, 118 Haw. 247, 188 P.3d 761 (App. 
2008». 
142 Kahana Sunset, 86 Haw. at 75, 947 P.2d at 387. 
143 Id. 
144 Koa Ridge, 109 Haw. at 416, 126 P.3d at 1103. 
145 Id. at 417, 126 P.3d at 1104. The court found that the LUC did a comprehensive review 
ofthe project and imposed a variety of conditions, that the project required the LUC's approval 
before it could proceed, that the LUC's decision was a "discretionary approval" that the project 
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required for the proj ect to move forward, even if it did not have final approval 
authority.146 Specifically, the court reasoned that reclassification "in and of 
itself' does not trigger chapter 343,147 but that the statute applies if the project 
trips one of the statutory triggers. 148 Here, the reclassification proposed the use 
of state land; therefore reclassification was "the earliest practicable time" to do 
the EA. 149 
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Duffy anticipated and addressed an 
objection commonly heard from the development and consulting community-
that early review is, in fact, premature because the contours of the project are 
not sufficiently developed, putting the developer at risk of a chicken-and-egg 
process. ISO He found that "early environmental assessment" would avoid the 
influence that investments of time and money have on later review,151 
explaining that "while projects indeed may change in response to public input, 
actions of agencies, economic conditions, or other factors, requiring early 
environmental assessment comports with the purpose ofHEPA to 'ensure that 
environmental concerns are given appropriate consideration in decision 
making"IS2 and provides a safeguard against a 'post hoc rationalization[] to 
support action already taken. ",153 
Ironically, Koa Ridge has become a boogeyman in the minds of the 
development communityl54 and an example of the Hawai'i Supreme Court 
needed to move ahead, meeting the requirements of chapter 343, and that nothing exempted the 
project from the environmental review law. Id. 
146 /d. 
147 Id. at 416,126 P.3d at 1103 (emphasis omitted). 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 416-17,126 P.3d at 1103-04. 
150 Id. at 418-20,126 P.3d at 1105-07. 
151 Id. at419, 126 P.3d at 1106 (citations omitted). Handing a final loss to the LUC and the 
developer, Justice Duffy rejected their last-ditch argument that, even if chapter 343 applied, the 
LUC's process could be substituted for environmental review, thereby giving them an escape 
from the Sierra Club's lawsuit, implicitly rejecting the functional equivalence doctrine. Id. at 
420, 126 P .3d at 1107. See supra note 63 for more discussion of this doctrine. 
152 Id. at 418, 126 P.3d at 1105 (citing HAW. REV. STAT. § 343-1). 
153 Id. (citing Citizens for the Prot. of the N. Kohala Coastline v. Cnty. ofHawai'i, 91 Haw. 
94, 105,979 P.2d 1120, 1131 (1999) (brackets in original)). 
154 Koa Ridge has often been cited by developers as a flawed decision. See, e.g., Derrick 
DePledge, Chamber Urging Review Law Exemption, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Jan. 20, 2008, 
available at http://the.honoluluadvertiser.comlarticle/2008/J anl20/1nlhawaii80 1200357 .html. 
Two years later, that boogeyman arose again in the Intermediate Court of Appeals (lCA) 
decision 'Ohana Pale Ke Ao v. Board of Agriculture, 118 Haw. 247,188 P.3d 761 (App.2008). 
The ICA held that chapter 343 review was required for the State Department of Agriculture's 
granting of a permit to Mera Pharmaceuticals to import genetically engineered algae for a 
project at the state-run Natural Energy Laboratory of Hawaii (NELH) facility in Kona because 
the importation proposal constituted ''use of state land," id. at 254, 188 P.3d at 768, and section 
343-5 "plainly and unambiguously required preparation of an EA before the Board could 
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going too far on the "use of state or county lands or funds.,,155 Yet, as to that 
ruling, Justice Duffy was well within the clear boundaries of the two prior cases 
directly on point. The defendants admitted as much. The lesser-examined 
ruling about timing is the more powerful one. With the court's clarification 
that "earliest practicable time" means during the zoning stages of development, 
Koa Ridge sets up many possible scenarios where a developer will later be 
required to supplement the early EA or EIS due to the changes in the project 
itself or the lapse in time. Large projects, particularly master planned projects 
that are phased over many years, sometimes decades, fall under this scenario. 
The court's ruling put all the more pressure on the supplementation process, a 
controversial issue that would squarely come before the court four years later in 
the Turtle Bay case. 156 
E. Game-Changers and Ferry-Stoppers: Superferry I and Superferry II 
Arriving on Hawai'i's shores in 2003, the privately owned and operated 
Hawaii Superferry project involved high-speed catamaran-style vessels that 
would travel between O'ahu, Maui, Kaua'i, and the island of Hawai'i, using 
state harbor facilities on each island. ls7 The ferries were 350-feet long and 
capable of carrying 866 passengers and 282 cars per trip.IS8 To accommodate 
the new vessels, the State Department of Transportation (DOT) proposed 
spending $40 million on harbor improvements, starting with $10 million in 
upgrades at Kahului Harbor. 159 In February 2005, DOT determined that the 
project was exempt from environmental review under chapter 343. 160 On 
March 21, 2005, Sierra Club, Maui Tomorrow Inc., and the Kahului Harbor 
Coalition filed a complaint in the Second Circuit Court on Maui challenging 
the lack of an EA I61 Ultimately, the plaintiffs prevailed in two game-changing 
and, ultimately, ferry-stopping Hawai'i Supreme Court decisions: Superferry 
approve Mera's application." Id. This decision, too, has caused great consternation among 
some, particularly among the university research community. KiM, ANTOLINI & RApPA, supra 
note 16, at 17. 
155 See HAW. REv. STAT. § 343-5(a)(I) (2010). 
156 See infra Part II.F. 
157 Superferry I, 115 Haw. 299, 305, 167 P.3d 292, 298 (2007). The State Public Utilities 
Commission granted Superferry an operating permit in 2004, id. at305 n.5, 167 P.3d at 298 n.5, 
but demurred on whether an EA was required. See State Pub. Utils. Comm'n, In the Matter of 
Application of Hawaii Superferry inc., for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity To 
Engage in Operations as a Water Carrier, Docket No. 04-0180 (2004), Decision and Order No. 
21524, at 25 (conditioning its approval on compliance with chapter 343). 
158 Superferry 1,115 Haw. at 305,167 P.3d at 298. 
159 Id 
160 Id. at 311 n.15, 167 P.3d at304n.15. 
161 Id. at311, 167P.3dat304. 
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1,162 issued by the court in August 2007 on the merits and standing; and two 
years later, Superferry II,163 decided in March 2009, on the constitutionality of 
Act 2 and attorneys' fees. Ultimately, the Hawaii Superferry never completed 
the environmental review process ordered by the court or the "faux" review 
process required by the Legislature. The Hawaii Superferry went bankrupt. 164 
The Superferry I and II decisions, both written by Justice Duffy for a 
unanimous l65 court, were blockbusters in the field of Hawai'i environmental 
law in five main ways. First, the court took a firm stance in continuing to 
interpret chapter 343 according to its plain language and in favor of public 
participation despite the very strong economic and political pressure to do 
otherwise. Second, the court issued a ground-breaking decision adopting 
"procedural standing," throwing open the courthouse doors in Hawai'i even 
more widely to citizen groups in chapter 343 cases. Third, the court boldly 
declared Act 2, a special law passed to allow Superferry to evade chapter 343-
a law vociferously pushed by Superferry and Governor Linda Lingle in a 
special session and quickly adopted by a cowering legislature-unconstitutional 
and void. Fourth, the court embraced the powerful private attorney general 
theory, in addition to the little-used statutory fees statute (H.R.S. section 607-
25), in upholding an attorneys' fees award to the plaintiffs against both 
Superferry and DOT. 166 Finally, the court stuck to its judicial guns in enforcing 
chapter 343 by shutting down Superferry until it complied with the law-
despite heavy political maneuvering, an unprecedented outcry by vocal 
supporters of the company, and the fact that Superferry actually began 
operating in utter defiance of the court's order and continued to operate (under 
Act 2) for over a year before the court issued its final decision. The court 
showed true judicial grit. 
1. Superferry I: Significant risks and a significant shift in standing 
jurisprudence 
In the 2007 Superferry I decision, Justice Duffy, writing for a unanimous 
court, issued a forty-four-page opinion that reversed, remanded, and ordered the 
circuit court to enter summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on their 
request for an EA. 167 Initially, the court issued a "stunningly quick,,168 one 
162 115 Haw. 299, 167 P.3d 292. 
163 Superferry II, 120 Haw. 181,202 P.3d 1226 (2009). 
164 Hawaii Superferry Goes Bankrupt, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/0 I/us/O 1 ferry.html. 
165 See infra note 225 regarding Justice Nakayama and ChiefJustice Moon's dissent on the 
sovereign immunity theory. 
166 See infra Part II.E.2. 
167 Superferry I, 115 Haw. 299, 167 P.3d 292. 
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page order, 169 finding a violation of chapter 343 only hours after a high-tension 
oral argument before the court on August 23. 170 This speedy order and the 
longer ruling issued one week laterl7l were shocking to those unfamiliar with 
the actual language of chapter 343 and became the spark for a most unusual 
chain of events that led to a constitutional crisis in Hawai'i state government. 
In the full opinion, Justice Duffy spent little time on the merits-finding 
without much difficulty that DOT violated chapter 343-but he then expended 
an enormous amount of judicial energy on a ground-breaking ruling on 
standing. On the merits, he addressed the core issues of applicability, scope, 
triggers, and exemptions. First, with a tip of the hat to defendants DOT and 
Superferry, he noted that chapter 343 did not apply to private projects "such as 
this one where government plays a facilitative role for a private project that 
itself does not constitute an applicant action.,,172 Moreover, he rejected the 
Sierra Club's claim that the project involved "connected actions," finding that 
the private Superferry project was not an "action" as defined by chapter 343, 
and that the plaintiffs had not shown that the ferry required state approval to 
proceed. 173 The significance of this ruling has been buried, but it is worth 
pausing to consider. Despite popular perception, it was the $40 million state 
harbor project, and not the Superferry itself, that triggered environmental 
review. 174 
Second, reaching the heart of the Sierra Club's claims, the court found that 
DOT erred by looking at the harbor improvement project "in isolation,,,175 and, 
"[p ]urposely or not,,,176 that DOT failed to take "a hard look. " 177 In other 
words, DOT did not think much about examining the broader impacts of the 
project. Because "DOT did not consider whether its facilitation of the Hawaii 
Superferry Project will probably have minimal or no significant impacts, both 
168 Ken Kobayashi & Derrick DePledge, Impact Study May Delay Superjeny, HONOLULU 
ADVERTISER, Aug. 24, 2007, available at http://the.honoluluadvertiser.comlarticle/2007/ 
Aug/241lnlhawaii708240371.htrnl (noting that the court issued its decision five hours after 
argument). 
169 Sierra Club v. Dep't ofTransp., No. 27407, 2007 WL 2428467 (Haw. Aug. 23, 2007). 
170 See Brian Perry, High Court Rules Against Superferry, MAUl NEWS, Aug. 24, 2007, 
available at http://www.mauinews.comlpage/content.detaillidl33481IHigh-court-rules-against-
Superferry.html. 
171 Superfeny I, lIS Haw. at 305, 167 P.3d at 298. 
l72 Id. at 338, 167 P.3d at 331. 
173 Id. at 336-38, 167 P.3d at 329-31. 
174 See id. at 337,167 P.3d at 330. 
175 Id. at 341, 167 P.3d at 334. 
176 !d. at 342, 167 P.3d at 335. 
177 Id. (citing Price v. Obayashi Haw. Corp., 81 Haw. 171, 182 n.12, 914 P.2d 1364, 1375 
n.12 (1996) (citation omitted». 
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primary and secondary, on the environment," the agency's exemption 
determination was invalid. 178 Back to square one? Not yet. 
Defendants DOT and Superferry had challenged the Sierra Club's and Maui 
Tomorrow's standing to bring their chapter 343 case. In foresight, it was 
perhaps an understandable move in light of the court's 2002 Sierra Club v. 
Hawaii Tourism Authority (HTA) decision, where the Sierra Club lost on 
standing after advocating a cutting-edge procedural standing theory.179 In 
hindsight, this was a strategic blunder by the defendants. The court ended up 
picking up the pieces from the split decision in HT A and issuing a game-
changing opinion that, while well-grounded in federal NEPA case law, 180 
substantially broadened the standing horizons for citizen groups in chapter 343 
challenges for the foreseeable future. 
In adopting the procedural standing theory that Justice Nakayama had 
articulated in HTA, Justice Duffy carefully and painstakingly explored the 
history, nature, and contours of substantive versus procedural standing under 
both Hawai'i and federal environmental review case law. After sixteen pages 
of analysis, he found that the plaintiffs had both "group" and "individual" 
standing,181 under both the traditional "injury in fact" test and the newer 
"procedural injury" test. Presciently, the court also noted that a "less rigorous" 
standing test in chapter 343 cases was grounded in the Hawai'i constitutional 
provision, article XI, section 9, which guarantees a "clean and healthful 
environment. ,,182 
178 Id. at 342, 167 P.3d at 335. 
179 See Sierra Club v. Haw. Tourism Auth. (HTA), 100 Haw. 242, 257, 59 P.3d 877, 892 
(2002). See discussion infra Part III. 
180 Stewart Yerton, Comment, Procedural Standing and the Hawaii Superferry Decision: 
How a Surfer, a Paddler, and an Orchid Farmer Aligned Hawaii's Standing Doctrine with 
Federal Principles, 12 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'y J. 330 (2010). 
181 As for group standing, the court explained and embraced the well-accepted federal test 
that: 
[a]n association may sue on behalf of its members--even though it has not itself been 
injured-when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; 
(b) the interest it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) 
neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual 
members in the lawsuit. 
Superferry I, 115 Haw. at 334, 167 P.3d at 327 (citing Haw. Med. Ass'n v. Haw. Med. Servo 
Ass'n, Inc., 113 Haw. 77,95,148 P.3d 1179, 1197 (2006) (citation omitted)). 
182 Id. at 320, 167 P.3d at 313 (citing HAw. CONST. art. XI, § 9). The court squarely 
addressed the power of article XI, section 9 three years later in the 20 I 0 Ala Loop decision, 
finding-outside of the chapter 343 context-that the constitutional provision packed a real 
punch, allowing a community group to bring a private right of action to challenge the County of 
Hawai'i's decision to allow the development ofa charter school in violation of state land use 
laws. Cnty. of Hawai'i v. Ala Loop Homeowners, 123 Haw. 391,235 P.3d 1103 (2010). 
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Standing had come up frequently in the court's prior chapter 343 decisions, 
but never had the court taken such bold steps jurisprudentially. In North 
Kohala, where the plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, the court applied the 
traditional three-part "injury in fact" test and found that the citizens' group had 
adequately demonstrated standing to challenge the adverse ruling in the 
contested case hearing regarding the proposed resort development. 183 Although 
not a thorough analysis of standing under chapter 343, North Kohala reiterated 
that the Hawai' i courts have generally taken a broad view of standing in 
environmental cases. 184 Environmental standing had arisen most directly five 
years earlier in HTA, where a fractured court ultimately rejected the Sierra 
Club's standing to challenge the State's $114 million tourism marketing plan 
on the basis of a lack of geographic nexus. 185 A majority of the court did, 
however, adopt in theory the more flexible "procedural standing" test offered in 
Justice Nakayama's concurrence, 186 and this later became the prevailing theory 
in Superferry 1. 187 
Consistent with the theory that the Moon Court viewed beneficial public 
participation as a normative underpinning of chapter 343, the court articulated a 
new, more flexible procedural injury test that further lowers the bar for citizens 
seeking to enter the courtroom. To establish a procedural injury, a plaintiff 
must show: 
(1) the plaintiffhas been accorded a procedural right, which was violated in some 
way, ... [such as] a failure to conduct an EA; (2) the procedural right protects 
the plaintiffs concrete interests; and (3) the procedural violation threatens the 
plaintiffs concrete interests, thus affecting the plaintiff"personally," which may 
be demonstrated by showing (a) a "geographic nexus" to the site in question and 
(b) that the procedural violation increases the risk of harm to the plaintiffs 
concrete interests. 188 
The court's standing analysis has been described by one commentator as 
"well-articulated" but "tortured,,,189 and another criticized it as "throwing open 
the bam door after the horses have been let OUt.,,190 
183 Citizens for the Prot. of the N. Kohala Coastline v. Cnty. ofHawai'i (North Kohala), 91 
Haw. 94, 100-02,979 P.2d 1120, 1126-28 (1999). 
184 Id. 
185 Sierra Club v. Haw. Tourism Auth. (HTA), 100 Haw. 242, 59 P.3d 877 (2002). 
186 Id. at 265-68,59 P.3d at 900-03 (Nakayama, J., concurring). 
187 SuperferryI, 115 Haw. at 322, l67P.3dat315. 
188 [d. at 329, 167 P.3d at 322 (internal citation omitted). 
189 Yerton, supra note 180, at 369 (suggesting a simpler test for standing). 
190 Robert Thomas, Superferry EIS Case Summary: Part II, INVERSECONDEMNATION.COM 
(Sept. 30, 2007), http://www.inversecondemnation.com/inversecondemnationl2007/09/ 
superferry-ei-l.html. 
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2. Superferry II: A constitutional show-down and more 
open doors for citizen plaintiffs 
The story ofthe Superferry itself after Justice Duffy's blockbuster decision is 
a legal, political, economic, and social tale almost beyond belief. The 
controversy included protests in the water and on land, heated and over-heated 
debates in high circles, a circuit court injunction against Superferry operations, 
painful legislative arm-twisting, a gubernatorial power-grab, a dissolved 
injunction, headlines galore, and neighbors arguing with neighbors in Longs 
Drugs. 
Although the court's August 23,2007 summary opinion had ruled squarely 
in favor of the plaintiffs and constrained the circuit court to issue summary 
judgment that defendants had violated chapter 343, the Superferry defiantly set 
sail with special media and employee passenger runs the day before, on August 
22,191 and again on August 28, with hundreds of public passengers lured by $5 
inaugural fares. 192 Chaos ensued. The boat first sailed to Maui, where it was 
greeted by angry but peaceful protesters. 193 Many drivers off-loaded their cars 
and trucks, not guessing that they would be stuck there for many days when the 
Superferry failed to return on schedule. 194 When the Superferrytried to sail into 
the harbor on Kaua'i, surfers, paddlers, and swimmers blocked its path, 
prompting the Coast Guard to battle the protesters and eventually forcing the 
vessel and anxious passengers to tum back to O'ahu. 195 One day after the 
August 23,2007 opinion, Circuit Court Judge Cardoza followed the Hawai'i 
Supreme Court's orders and entered summary judgment in favor of the Sierra 
191 See Superjerry Takes Virgin Voyage: Guests Kick Back with Free Food, Drinks, 
KlTV.cOM, Aug. 22, 2007, http://www.kitv.comlnewsI13945640/detail.html. 
192 Dan Nakaso & Christie Wilson, Hawaii Superferry Starts Tomorrow for $5, HONOLULU 
ADVERTISER, Aug. 27, 2007, available at http://the.honoluluadvertiser.comlarticle/ 
2007/Aug!25/lnlhawaii708250354.htrnl ("Flying in the face of possible legal action, the Hawaii 
Superferry will launch two days ahead of schedule tomorrow with $5 one-way tickets for 
passengers and $5 one-way tickets for vehicles, the company announced yesterday. Opponents, 
who plan to seek an injunction against Superferry operations on Monday, reacted angrily, saying 
the company is defying state laws and acting in bad faith."). 
193 Claudine San Nicholas, Ferry Passengers Travel by Air Instead, MAUl NEWS, Aug. 29, 
2007, available at http://betaI00.mauinews.comlpageicontent.detaillidl336l4IFerry-passengers-
travel-by-air-instead-.htrnl?nav=lO ("About a dozen protesters greeted the first paying 
passengers into Kahului Harbor on Sunday with handmade signs saying 'Respect Our Home' 
and 'Stupid Ferry, Stupid Riders."'). 
194 Id. 
195 See Jan TenBruggencate & Rick Daysog, Surfers Block Hawaii Superjerry, USA TODAY, 
Aug. 27, 2007, available at http://www.usatoday.comltravellnews/2007-08-27-hawaii-
superferry _N.htm. See also Dan Nakaso & Derrick DePledge, Hawaii Superferry Halts Kauai 
Route, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Aug. 29, 2007, available at http://the.honoluluadvertiser.coml 
article/2007/ Aug! 29/lnlhawaii 708290426.html. 
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Club. 196 A few days later, on August 27,2007, the Sierra Club moved ex parte 
for a temporary restraining order (TRO) to stop DOT and Superferry operations 
at Kahului Harbor on Maui. 197 Judge Cardoza granted the TRO for ten days "to 
avoid immediate and irreparable injury" because the Superferry was 
operating. 198 Judge Cardoza required the Superferry to immediately cease 
operations at Kahului Harbor and return stranded passengers '''home.,,199 The 
entire state seemed in turmoil over the Superferry. That same day, the Sierra 
Club sought a permanent injunction.2oo On October 9,2007, after presiding 
over hearings lasting several weeks, Judge Cardoza granted the Sierra Club's 
request and permanently enjoined Superferry operations.201 The judge stated 
the injunction would remain in place while the EA was prepared and until the 
environmental review process under chapter 343 "has been lawfully 
concluded. ,,202 The judge also voided the operating agreement between DOT 
and Superferryfor Kahului Harbor for lack of compliance with chapter 343.203 
Opening the way for a major ruling on attorneys' fees by the Hawai'i Supreme 
Court in Superfeny II, Judge Cardoza then authorized the Sierra Club to 
request attorneys' fees as the prevailing party.204 
Shut down and stopped almost literally in the water, Superferry appealed to 
Governor Lingle for relief.205 On October 23,2007, the Governor issued an 
unusual Proclamation convening both houses of the State Legislature into a 
special session to dissolve the injunction against the Superferry.206 The next 
day, on October 24, 2007, the Legislature convened.207 A week later, on 
November 2,2007, the Legislature passed and advanced to the fifth floor of the 
Capitol a most unusual bill that Governor Lingle signed as Act 2 of the second 
special session.208 The Act waived the chapter 343 requirements for "a large 
capacity ferry vessel,,,209 created a "faux" environmental review process,210 and 
required the Governor to determine whether certain "conditions" were met for 
196 Superferry II, 120 Haw. 181, 187,202 P.3d 1226, 1232 (2009). 
197 Id. 
198 Id. at 188,202 P.3d at 1233. 
199 Id. at 189,202 P.3d at 1234. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 189-90,202 P.3d at 1234-35. 
202 !d. at 190,202 P.3d at 1235. 
203 Id. 
204 !d. 
205 See Auditor Finds Superferry Pressured Officials, KlTV.cOM, Apr. 18, 2008, 
http://www.kitv.comlnews/15925418/detail.html. 




210 Id. at 191,202 P.3d at 1236. 
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operations.2l1 Two days later, the Governor declared the conditions were met 
and cleared the way for Superferry, now identified as a "large capacity ferry 
vessel company," to sail yet again.2I2 Ironically, five days later on November 9, 
2007, Judge Cardoza entered his findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
favor of Sierra Club, noting that the "monetary loss" incurred by DOT and 
Superferry "is not a sufficient basis for forbearing to issue an injunction[,],,213 
adding that "[f]inanciallosses do not outweigh the interest in environmental 
protection whenever the two clash, as they often do.,,214 But while Judge 
Cardoza was drafting those findings, Superferry and DOT had already asked 
him, based on the new Act 2, to dissolve the injunction and order vacating the 
operating agreement.215 On the same day, the Sierra Club also asked for final 
judgment/16 which the court later granted despite Act 2.217 Nine days later, 
Judge Cardoza granted DOT and Superferry's motions, dissolved the order, and 
un-voided the operating agreement.218 The court, however, still allowed the 
Sierra Club to seek fees, which it did.219 The parties filed cross-appeals, and 
Judge Cardoza granted the Sierra Club's motion for fees and costs for a total of 
$91,712.72 based on H.R.S. section 607_25.220 In April, the parties filed 
further cross-appeals.221 In October, the Hawai'i Supreme Court took the 
appeal and, on December 18, 2008, it held another packed-house oral 
argument.222 Thus, after the Superferry encountered months of literal and 





215 Id. at 192,202 P.3d at 1237. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. at 193,202 P.3d at 1238. 
218 Id. at 192,202 P.3d at 1237. 
219 Id. at 192-93,202 P.3d at 1237-38. 
220 Id. at 194-95,202 P.3d at 1238-39. 
221 Id. at 195,202 P.3d at 1240. 
222 Id. 
223 The Superferry experienced many weather obstacles, significant operational difficulties, 
and continued protests during its initial operating period under Act 2, as well as frequent reports 
of sick passengers. See Gene Park, Aloha/or the Alakai, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Dec. 14, 
2007, available at http://archives.starbulletin.coml2007112/14/news/storyOl.html( describing 
rough weather, dock damage, and sick passengers on the prior day's voyage); Gary Kubota, 
Boat's Protestors Create a Clamor in Kahului, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Dec. 14,2007, 
available at http://archives.starbulletin.coml2007 112/14/news/storyOl.html (reporting that about 
300 protestors greeted the vessel, including paddlers and surfers, as well as "scores of law 
enforcement officers," including a helicopter and water patrol); Claudine San Nicolas, Ride 
'Really Really Rough, ' MAUl NEWS, Apr. 8, 2008, available at 
http://www.mauinews.comlpage/content.detail/idl502298.html?nav=1 0 (stating that 
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ended up right back under the steely gaze of the Hawai'i Supreme Court, this 
time through Sierra Club's constitutional challenge to Act 2. The Legislature's 
not-too-cleverly disguised "large capacity ferry vessel" exemption from chapter 
343 was now up for judicial examination by a thoroughly un-amused court, 
which had seen the DOT and Superferry-and now the Governor and 
Legislature-belligerantly defy its earlier ruling. It took little time for the 
Hawai'i Supreme Court to declare the law illusory and deliciously skewer Act 2 
as unconstitutional. 224 
In Superferry II, issued on March 16, 2009, Justice Duffy wrote for a 
unanimous court on the question of Act 2's unconstitutionality; the court split 
slightly only on the issue of attorneys' fees.225 Justice Duffy wrote seventeen 
dense pages226 on why the Legislature had violated article XI, section 5 of the 
Hawai'i Constitution.227 He found that Act 2 was an exercise of legislative 
power over state lands at Kahului Harbor,228 and that it was an illegal "special 
law" because only the Superferry met the Act's limited requirements and the 
twenty-one-month sunset provision,229 creating an "illusory class" of one?30 
Therefore, Act 2 was unconstitutional.23\ 
The court then turned to attorneys' fees. Usually litigants in the American 
legal system must pay their own costs and attorneys' fees whether they win or 
10se.232 In the field of environmental law, however, Congress and state 
legislatures have sought to encourage public interest litigation by setting up a 
system for judicial awards of fees and costs to the prevailing party to counter-
balance the high costs of bringing an enforcement action?33 Hawai'i's 
environmental laws do not generally have express fee award provisions similar 
"[p ]assengers arriving in Kahului said many of them were puking during the ride" and that the 
Superferry was out of service for weeks to undergo dry dock repairs for rudder damage). 
224 Supeiferry II, 120 Haw. at 206, 202 P.3d at 1251. 
225 Justice Duffy lost the votes of Justice Nakayama and Chief Justice Moon only on the last 
issue of whether sovereign immunity protected DOT from attorneys' fees. Id. at 231-36,202 
P.3d at 1276-81 (Nakayama, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Nakayama, joined by Chief 
Justice Moon, agreed with the entirety of Justice Duffy's analysis and holdings, except for this 
immunity issue, reasoning that the State cannot waive its immunity. Id. 
226 Id. at 197-214,202 P.3d at 1242-59 (majority opinion). 
227 Article XI, section 5 of the Hawai'i Constitution limits the legislative power over state 
lands to "general laws," id. at 231,202 P.3d at 1276, and prohibits "special" or "illusory" laws 
in favor of specific parties. /d. at 199-214, 202 P.3d at 1244-59. 
228 Id. at 198-99,202 P.3d at 1243-44. 
229 Id. at 199-203,202 P.3d at 1244-48. 
230 Id. at 203-14,202 P.3d at 1248-59. 
231 Id. at 214,202 P.3d at 1259. 
232 Id. at 218, 202 P.3d at 1263. 
233 MICHAEL D. AxLINE, ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS 8-2 (1995). 
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to those common at the federalleve1.234 Justice Duffy, however, found that 
Judge Cardoza had correctly found the Sierra Club and the other plaintiffs to be 
the prevailing parties under HRS section 607-25,235 and that Act 2's attempt to 
pull the legal rug out from under the plaintiffs had not changed their winning 
status?36 
The court then proceeded to address the novel theory raised by the Sierra 
Club that the plaintiffs were also entitled to fees under the private attorney 
general theory even though Act 2 changed (at least temporarily) the law of the 
land.237 In thirteen pages of ground-breaking analysis, Justice Duffy applied 
the private attorney general doctrine to the plaintiffs' request for reimbursement 
of attorneys' fees. 238 Using analysis from a case decided a few years before, 
Maui Tomorrow v. Board of Land & Natural Resources/39 the court 
recognized its own approval, in principle, of the "equitable rule that allows 
courts in their discretion to award [attorneys'] fees to plaintiffs who have 
vindicated important public rights. ,,240 Although the court had only mentioned 
but not applied the doctrine in Maui Tomorrow, it was primed and ready to do 
so in Supeiferry II. 
The court first set out the three-part test to assess the "strength or societal 
importance of the public policy vindicated by the litigation," "the necessity for 
private enforcement and the magnitude ofthe resultant burden on the plaintiff," 
and "the number of people standing to benefit from the decision.,,241 On the 
first prong, the court agreed with the Sierra Club that the "litigation [was] 
responsible for establishing the principle of procedural standing in 
234 Other than HRS section 607-25, the only Hawai'i environmental laws with an explicit 
attorneys' fees provision are (I) the Hawaii Air Pollution Control Act, HRS chapter 342B, 
of which section -56 allows for citizens' suits and subsection -56(f) allows for attorneys' 
fees and costs, and (2) Hawai'i's environmental response law, HRS chapter 128D, which 
also allows for citizens' suits and fees at section -21. HRS chapter 195, Hawai'i's 
endangered species law, allows for citizens' suits, but does not provide for fees. For more 
on the lack ofHawai'i citizens' suits and attorneys' fees, see David Frankel, Enforcement of 
Environmental Laws in Hawaii, 16 U. HAW. L. REv. 85, 136-141 (1994). 
235 In 1986, the Hawai'i Legislature enacted what became Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 
607-25, providing that successful citizen-plaintiffs in some limited situations could seek a 
reasonable award of attorneys' fees from a defendant found to have violated a permitting law. 
Until Superferry II, plaintiffs had not been successful in using section 607-25 to recover fees. 
Superferry II, 120 Haw. at 214-17,202 P.3d at 1259-62. 
236 Id. at 218,202 P.3d at 1263. 
237 Id. 
238 Id. at 218-31,202 P.3d at 1263-76. 
239 110 Haw. 234, 131 P .3d 517 (2006). 
240 Superferry II, 120 Haw. at 218, 202 P.3d at 1263 (citing Maui Tomorrow, 110 Haw. at 
244, 131 P.3d at 527 (quoting In re Water Use Permit Applications, 96 Haw. 27, 29, 25 P.3d 
802,804 (2001))). 
241 Id. at 218,202 P.3d at 1263. 
2011 / THE MOON COURT'S ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW 613 
environmental law in Hawai'i and clarifying the importance of addressing the 
secondary impacts of a project in the environmental review process pursuant to 
HRS chapter 343.,,242 On the second prong, the court again agreed with the 
Sierra Club that the plaintiffs "were solely responsible for challenging DOT's 
erroneous application of its responsibilities under HRS chapter 343.,,243 
Showing its displeasure with DOT's behavior, the court stated: "in this case 
DOT wholly abandoned that duty ['to consider both the primary and secondary 
impacts of the Superferry project on the environment'] by issuing an erroneous 
exemption to Superferry.,,244 On the last prong, directly addressing the public 
benefit theory, the court again agreed with the plaintiffs, citing back to the 
Superferry I quote that leads off this article, emphasizing that everyone benefits 
from public participation. Formally, the court adopted the private attorney 
general doctrine and concluded that the Sierra Club met its requirements.245 
The court, however, was not quite done with the defendants. 
The court then addressed DOT and Superferry's arguments that H.R.S. 
section 607-25 was the exclusive means for an attorneys' fees award for 
violations of chapter 343 and that, under that statute and sovereign immunity, 
only Superferry and not DOT was subject to a fee award.246 Superferry also 
continued to argue it was not subject to any fee award. The court showed no 
mercy. It concluded that H.R.S. section 607-25 was not the "the exclusive 
means" for awarding fees,l47 that the section did not prevent an award offees 
against Superferry under the private attorney general doctrine,248 and that 
sovereign immunity did not prevent an award against DOT .249 The court 
agreed with Superferry that the company's use of facilities already constructed 
(by DOT) did not fit the term "development" under H.R.S. section 607_25,250 
rendering Superferry not subject to that fee statute.251 Nonetheless, the court 
imposed attorneys' fees on Superferry under the private attorney general 
theory.252 The court observed that 
in this caseL] Superferry worked hand-in-hand with DOT throughout the 
planning and implementation of the Superferry project and throughout this 
242 Id at 220, 202 P.3d at 1265. 
243 Id 
244 Id at 221,202 P.3d at 1266. 
245 !d. 
246 Id 
247 Id. at 222, 202 P.3d at 1267. 
248 Id 
249 Id at 222, 225-30, 202 P.3d at 1267, 1270-75. 
250 Id at 225,202 P.3d at 1270. 
251 Jd 
252 Id ("[W]e see no reason not to apply the private attorney general doctrine to a private 
defendant. "). 
614 University ofHawai'i Law Review / Vol. 33:581 
litigation, in promoting its own private business interests. Under these facts, we 
see no unfairness in requiring Superferry, jointly with DOT, to pay Sierra Club's 
attorney's fees awarded by the circuit court.253 
Superferry II not only was a resounding endorsement of the public benefit 
theory applied to chapter 343, it changed the landscape of this already lively 
field of litigation. Undoubtedly, environmental groups in the future will be 
encouraged to be even bolder in seeking judicial review. If the potential public 
benefit is large enough, even the slim hope of attorneys' fees can magnify the 
incentive to bring a difficult chapter 343 case. 
F. Turtle Bay: The Citizen Watchdog Never Sleeps 
Most Hawai'i court decisions under chapter 343 focus on the top of the 
"applicability funnel," that is, detennining when the law applies and the 
breadth of projects subject to its scope. If the environmental review process 
moves along competently, from drafts and final EAs to drafts and final EISs 
(FEISs), the opportunities for successful citizen suits diminish rapidly. Once 
the agency has accepted a final EIS, the chances for a winning citizen suit are 
slim but not zero. The Hawai'i Supreme Court's 2010 decision in what is 
commonly known as the "Turtle Bay" case, and officially as Unite Here! Local 
5 v. City and County of Honolulu/54 represents another monumental decision 
by the Moon Court, this time authored by Chief Justice Moon himself. The 
case indicates that the citizen watchdog under chapter 343 never truly sleeps; it 
endorses the right of citizens to keep the review process alive in certain 
circumstances long after the completion of the FEIS.255 
253 Id. 
254 Unite Here! LocalS v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu (Turtle Bay), 123 Haw. 150,231 P.3d 
423 (2010). 
255 Although not directly a "supplemental" case, the ICA decision in 'Ohana Pale Ke Ao v. 
Board of Agriculture, 118 Haw. 247,188 P.3d 761 (App. 2008), addressed a related issue of the 
role of initial and subsequent environmental review (called "programmatic" and "tiering" in the 
federal NEP A system). The Natural Energy Laboratory of Hawaii (NELH) prepared EISs 
during its early years about the state research facility itself, and had anticipated that more 
specific review of particular research projects would follow. Id. at 249, 188 P.3d at 763. 
Essentially, by ordering the EA on Mera's proposed biopharm-algae project, the court was 
requiring a tiered EA, where the project-specific impacts would be addressed in the framework 
ofthe overall impacts. See id. at 255,188 P.3d at 769. 
The State Department of Business, Economic Development & Tourism (DBEDT) and the 
federal Department of Energy are currently preparing a programmatic joint state-federal EIS for 
the undersea energy cable project connecting the Lana'i and Moloka'i wind farms with O'ahu 
energy grids. Notice oflntent To Prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for 
the Hawaii Interisland Renewable Energy Program: Wind (DOEIEIS-0459), Dec. 14,2010, 
available at http://www.federalregister.gov/articlesl2010112114/20 1 0-3131 O/notice-of-intent-to-
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Turtle Bay addresses when citizen plaintiffs may successfully re-open an 
otherwise moribund environmental review process. The Turtle Bay Resort EIS 
had been completed in 1985 for an economically ambitious master plan 
expansion-including 1,450 new hotel units, 2,063 new condominium units, 
two golf courses, large commercial centers, and related amenities.256 Various 
components of the project started, then stopped, including the pouring of now-
unearthly concrete pilings for one of the hotels proposed near Kawela Bay?57 
Due to economic volatility, the master development lay dormant for the next 
twenty years until the efforts of the Kuilima Resort Company, the newest 
owners, to restart the project sparked public protest and lawsuits. Writing for a 
unanimous court, Chief Justice Moon agreed with the plaintiffs that the 
administrative rules required a supplemental EIS (SEIS), consistent with public 
policy and the purpose of chapter 343.258 The court stated that an EIS cannot 
remain valid "in perpetuity,,259 and found that ignoring the implicit time frame 
in an EIS would allow unlimited delays in projects and negative impacts on the 
environment to go unchecked?60 
The initial plaintiff in Turtle Bay was labor union Unite Here! Local 5, 
which in early 2006 was in contract negotiations with the venture capital 
owners ofthe Turtle Bay Resort. The resort had begun to revive its old master 
plan by asking for a subdivision of the property from the City and County of 
Honolulu?61 When the union began to settle the lawsuit and labor negotiations 
simultaneously, two citizens' groups-Keep the North Shore Country and the 
Sierra Club-stepped in to file a "back up" lawsuit in May and June 2006?62 
prepare-a-programmatic-environmental-impact-statement-for-the-hawaii-interisland. This PElS 
will be followed by site-specific EAs or EISs for particular sited projects. See Frequently Asked 
Questions, InterislandWind.com, http://www.interislandwind.comlFAQ.aspx#A5-1 ("These 
site-specific environmental studies by the two wind farm developers, Hawaiian Electric and 
Maui Electric companies and the State of Hawaii are to be tiered under the umbrella 
programmatic EIS for the Interisland Wind project."). Thus, this issue of downstream 
environmental review will likely continue to be a very hot issue in Hawai'i until best practices 
emerge as they have done at the federal level under NEP A. 
256 GROUP 70, REVISED ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, VOLUME 1: KUILIMA RESORT 
EXPANSION 24 (Oct. 7, 1985), available at http://www.defendoahucoalition.orgieis/eis05%20-
%20part%20iii. pdf. 
257 Turtle Bay, 123 Haw. at 157,231 P.3d at 430 ("Over the next twenty years, only certain 
aspects of the [p ]roj ect were completed. "); the comment regarding the pilings for the first hotel 
reflects the author's personal observations from visits to the area in the early 1990s through 
recent years at Kawela Bay. 
258 Id. at 154, 231 P .3d at 427. 
259 Id. at 181-82,231 P.3d at 454-55. 
260 Id. at 179, 231 P .3d at 452. 
261 Id. at 160, 231 P.3d at 433. 
262 The union dismissed its case, as predicted, in August 2006, leaving only the KNSC/Sierra 
Club action, id., although the caption was never changed. 
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The groups expressed concern about the lack of an SEIS given the staleness of 
the original 1985 EIS and the subsequent developments in environmental 
conditions, particularly traffic congestion, the resurgence of the threatened 
green sea turtle (for which Turtle Bay was named), and the re-appearance in the 
area of the endangered Hawaiian monk seal. 263 Community groups had 
vigorously opposed the expansion back in the 1980s as part of the "Keep the 
Country Country" movement,z64 but when the project went dormant due to 
changing owners and the economic downturn, the community focused on other 
battles. That is, until about 2005, when new owners decided to re-start the 
subdivision process in an effort to maximize the resale value of what would be 
smaller, packaged-for-development pieces of the 426-acre makai parcel.265 
The sleeping community giant awoke, galvanizing broad support to stop the 
expansion. The union and environmental groups' lawsuits focused on whether 
Kuilima's 2005 subdivision application to the City and County of Honolulu's 
Department of Planning and Permitting (DPP) to facilitate the parceling of the 
expansion of the resort-from one existing hotel to six hotels and several 
condominium projects that would bring an average of "4,783 persons on any 
given day" to the North Shore266 -triggered the need for a SEIS, pursuant to 
Hawai'i Administrative Rules sections 11-200-26 and _27,z67 In 1985, DPP's 
predecessor agency, the Department of Land Utilization, had accepted an EIS 
for the Kuilima resort expansion.268 The plaintiffs argued that DPP should 
require a supplemental analysis to update the twenty-year-old document before 
reviewing the subdivision application because the initial time frame for the 
project and EIS analysis had been exceeded and new information had emerged 
about impacts of the resort expansion on traffic and protected species.269 
Then-Circuit Court Judge Sabrina McKenna entered summary judgment for 
Kuilima Resort and the City,270 agreeing with the defendants that under H.A.R. 
sections 11-200-26 and -27, "a SEIS is required only when there is a 
substantive project change and determined that, as a matter oflaw, the timing 
263 Id at 164,231 P.3d at 437-38. 
264 For a history of the Keep the Country Country movement, see Curt Sanbum, Keeping the 
Country Country: A North Shore Couple's Never-Ending Battle with the City, HONOLULU 
WEEKLY, Mar. 2, 2011, available at http://hono1u1uweekly.comfcover/2011/03lkeeping-the-
country-country/. For background on the current coalition oflocal groups involved in opposing 
the resort expansion, see the web sites of Ko'olauloa North Shore Alliance 
(www.knsalliance.org), Defend Oahu Coalition (www.defendoahucoalition.org), and Keep the 
North Shore Country (www.keepthenorthshorecountry.org). 
265 Turtle Bay, 123 Haw. at 159,231 P.3d at 432. 
266 Id. at 155,231 P.3dat428. 
267 Id at 171,231 P.3d at 444. 
268 Id at 155, 231 P.3d at 428. 
269 Id. at 164-65,231 P.3d at 437-38. 
270 Id at 154,231 P.3d at 427. 
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of the project had not substantially changed.,,27\ On appeal to the Intennediate 
Court of Appeals (ICA), however, the panel split in a May 2009 opinion. 
Writing for the majority, Judge Dan Foley and Acting Chief Judge Corinne 
Watanabe agreed with Judge McKenna and found that DPP did not need to 
require a SEIS because there had not been a substantive change in the 
project.272 Judge Craig Nakamura dissented.273 Looking to the "overriding 
purpose of HEPA[,] . . . [i.e.,] to ensure that an agency is provided with 
relevant infonnation about the environmental impacts of a proposed project so 
that the agency can make informed decisions about the project,,,274 Judge 
Nakamura found that, even if a project has not itself changed, it can become 
"an essentially different action" because of changed circumstances and "the 
discovery of new information."m 
Examining the SEIS issue on appeal, Chief Justice Moon engaged in a two-
step inquiry: (1) due to the change in timing, was there essentially a different 
action under consideration, and (2) if so, was the change in the project 
"significant,,?276 He answered both questions in the affirmative.277 In some of 
the strongest language the court has used in chapter 343 cases, Chief Justice 
Moon excoriated the City for its poor decision-making process and for cutting 
the public out of the discussion. He concluded that "the plaintiffs have clearly 
presented 'new' evidence that was not considered at the time the 1985 EIS was 
prepared and that could likely have a significant impact on the environment.,,278 
He hammered the point home: "Any other result would be absurd and contrary 
to public policy in Hawai'i.,,279 Citing Judge Nakamura's dissent, Chief Justice 
Moon criticized the notion that a permitting process without specific deadlines 
could "remain valid in perpetuity.,,280 He emphasized: "Indeed, ignoring the 
implicit time condition dictated by the anticipated life of the project upon 
which an original EIS has been based would allow unlimited delays and, in 
tum, pennit possible resulting negative impacts on the environment to go 
unchecked.,,281 
271 ld. at 167,231 P.3d at 440 (emphasis in original). 
272 Unite Here! Local 5 v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 120 Haw. 457, 209 P.3d 1271 (App. 
2009). 
273 Id. at 468,209 P.3d at 1282 (Nakamura, J., dissenting). 
274 ld. at 471,209 P.3d at 1285 (citing HAW. REv. STAT. § 343-1 (1993)). 
275 Id. 
276 Turtle Bay, 123 Haw. at 177-79,231 P.3d at 450-52. 
277 Id. at 178-80, 231 P .3d at 451-53. 
278 Id. at 177,231 P.3d at 450 (citation omitted). 
279 Id. 
280 Id at 179, 231 P.3d at 452 (citing Unite Here! Local 5, 120 Haw. at 472, 209 P.3d at 
1286 (Nakamura, J., dissenting)) (emphasis omitted). 
281 Id. 
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When focusing on DPP's lack of a "hard look" at the subdivision 
application, Chief Justice Moon indicated that the agency had stuck its head in 
the sand, perhaps deliberately. He stated that "DPP ignored the most obvious 
fact that the 1985 EIS was based on detailed information current as of 1985, 
i. e., that the conditions upon which the 1985 EIS was based were over twenty 
years 0Id.,,282 He called DPP's assumption that conditions had not changed in 
twenty years "unreasonable,,,283 finding that its "unreasonable and seemingly 
cursory consideration of whether a SEIS was warranted" was arbitrary and 
capricious.284 In his concurring opinion, Justice Acoba emphasized that "the 
DPP had a duty to make an independent determination as to whether the EIS 
contained sufficient information to enable it to make an informed decision 
regarding the subdivision application. ,,285 Moreover, Justice Acoba (who later 
dissented on the motion for reconsiderationi86 concluded the agency had relied 
on projections of "questionable value.,,287 
Prior to chastising DPP, Chief Justice Moon repeated the now~ familiar theme 
of chapter 343 that "environmental consciousness is enhanced, cooperation and 
coordination are encouraged, and public participation during the review process 
benefits all parties involved and society as a whole.,,288 Thus, Turtle Bay 
completes, for now, the long line of chapter 343 cases where the court strongly 
endorses the value of citizen participation, even decades after the initial EIS is 
complete. Although the legal analysis of Turtle Bay falls squarely within the 
statutory ambit, the implications of latent public challenges to slow-moving 
development projects-particularly master planned communities-could be 
profound. 
Already, the new owners of the Turtle Bay Resort have announced that they 
"support the SEIS undertaking,,,289 and have begun to revamp the master plan, 
282 1d. at 181, 231 P .3d at 454 (emphasis in original). 
283 1d. 
284 1d. 
285 1d. at 183,231 P.3d at 456 (Acoba, J., concurring). On July 20,2010, the court denied a 
motion for reconsideration by defendants. Unite Here! Local 5 v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 
No. 28602, 2010 WL 2844362 (Haw. July 20, 2010). The majority reaffirmed the earlier 
decision, tersely ordering the supplemental review, id. at *1, in spite ofa dissent by Justice 
Acoba, where he argued that the DPP should be given the opportunity to make a new 
determination on requiring the SEIS. 1d. at *1-8 (Acoba, J., dissenting). 
286 Unite Here! Local 5, 2010 WL 2844362, at *1-8. 
287 Turtle Bay, 123 Haw. at 184, 231 P.3d at 457. 
288 1d. at 180,231 P.3d at 453 (majority opinion) (citing Kahana Sunset Owners Ass'n v. 
Cnty. ofMaui, 86 Haw. 66, 70, 947 P.2d 378, 382 (1997) (citation omitted»; see Citizens for 
the Prot. of the N. Kohala Coastline v. Cnty. ofHawai'i, 91 Haw. 94,104 n.l1, 979 P.2d 1120, 
1130 n.11 (1999) (citation omitted); see also Superferry 1, 115 Haw. 299, 327, 342, 167 P.3d 
292,320,335 (2007) (citation omitted). 
289 Letter from Drew Stotesbury, Replay Resorts Inc.rrurtle Bay Resort, to the community 
(Jan. 28, 2011) (on file with author) ("While the SEIS was a result ofa decision by the Hawai'i 
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trying to start afresh with the community?90 DPP has apparently created a new 
system for keeping track of when SEISs are warranted on projects undergoing 
discretionary approvals within the department. 291 The Turtle Bay decision will 
not cause the collapse of Hawai 'i' s economy, as claimed by the defendants and 
amicus curiae in the flood of briefs on the post-decision motion for 
reconsideration,292 but the decision should give serious pause to agencies and 
developers who have issued open-ended discretionary permits as well as to 
phased developments with latent permits and approvals.293 Until no further 
agency discretion remains to be exercised, the projects may continue to be 
subject to public scrutiny under chapter 343. 
Turtle Bay was not just about supplemental BISs, however. The decision 
also contained some very strong language endorsing the authority of the citizen-
based State Environmental Council, which is authorized under chapter 341 to 
promulgate the administrative rules for chapter 343. Although prior cases had 
acknowledged the role of the Environmental Council in promulgating rules for 
chapter 343, not until Turtle Bay did the court directly examine the scope of the 
Council's authority to interpret the statute. The governance issue arose because 
the defendants challenged the validity of the Council's rules regarding 
supplemental impact statements, which are not expressly referred to in chapter 
343.294 The court noted that the Legislature not only directed the Council to 
promulgate rules, but also gave it authority to further interpret the statute.295 
Supreme Court, just as importantly, it reflected the coordinated efforts of various stakeholders 
motivated to ensure the responsible development of the resort. We support the SEIS 
undertaking."). 
290 Curt Sanburn, Shoreganized, HONOLULU WEEKLY, Apr. 6, 2011, available at 
http://honoluluweekly.comldiary/2011/04/shoreganizedi. 
291 David Arakawa, Exec. Dir., Land Use Research Found., Presentation for the Hawaii State 
Bar Association Annual Meeting's Panel on Turtle Bay (Sept. 17, 2010) (author's 
observations). 
292 See DefendantiCounterclaim-PlaintifflAppellee Kuilima Resort Co.'s Motion for 
Reconsideration at 24, Unite Herel Local 5 v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, No. 28602,20 I 0 WL 
2844362 (Haw. July 20,2010), available at http://keepthenorthshorecountry.org!Documents/ 
SC%20-%20Motion%20to%20Reconsider.pdt) (referring to the amicus curiae brief of First 
Hawaiian Bank, stating that "such litigation would certainly cause a lengthy construction delay 
and cause construction to come to a grinding halt"). 
293 As Kuilima's attorneys have stated: "[T]he Decision has, at a minimum[,] armed any 
'concerned citizen' with the legal authority under the SEIS Rules to challenge developments 
that are outside of the time frame analyzed in its ElS, and which ha[ ve 1 not received all of its 
governmental approvals, regardless ofthe depth and breadth of other review of project impact, 
or other state and federal laws governing and protecting the area." Motion for Reconsideration, 
supra note 292, at 23-24. 
294 See Unite Here! Local 5 v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu (Turtle Bay), 123 Haw. 150, 174, 
231 P.3d 423, 447 (2010). 
295 Id. at 175-76, 231 P.3d at 448-49. 
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Citing established administrative law principles, the court noted that agencies 
have "implied powers that are reasonably necessary to carry out the powers 
expressly granted" and found that the Council's SEIS rules were consistent 
with chapter 343.296 
This little-noticed ruling could have significant implications for the future of 
chapter 343. Although the Environmental Council was stymied in its efforts to 
promulgate rule changes during the Lingle Administration, and the Council 
suspended all meetings for over a year out of frustration over this and other 
political roadblocks,297 the newly re-started and re-invigorated Environmental 
Council appears to have considerable interest in taking an active role in shaping 
chapter 343 policy and practice?98 Although not directly linked to citizen suits 
for chapter 343 violations, the court's endorsement of the role of the all-
volunteer citizen Environmental Council-which includes representatives from 
many sectors, including business, military, planning, and conservation, as well 
as the new OEQC Director, former Senator Gary Hooser99 -adds to the overall 
checks and balances in the state environmental review system. 
Moreover, Turtle Bay kept the door widely ajar for citizen suits in an area 
that often trips them Up300 -the appropriate application of the statute of 
limitations under chapter 343. The defendants challenged whether the 
plaintiffs had filed their lawsuit seeking a supplemental EIS within the required 
time frame under H.R.s. section 343_7.301 Noting that section 343-7 does not 
expressly address the question of supplemental documents, the court applied 
the 120-day limitation of -7(a), running the time from the date of DPP's 
approval of the subdivision application.302 The court rejected the defendants' 
296 Id. at 176,231 P.3d at 449 (emphasis and citation omitted) ("Moreover, the SEIS process 
established by the Environmental Council is consistent with HEPA and its objectives-i.e., 
'environmental consciousness is enhanced, cooperation and coordination are encouraged, and 
public participation during the review process benefits all parties involved and society as a 
whole,' HRS § 343-1-and furthers environmental review."). 
297 Sean Hao, Delays in State Waivers Stall Environmental Projects, HONOLULU STAR-
ADVERTISER, Aug. 1, 2010, available at http://www.staradvertiser.comlnews/20100801_ 
Delays_in _state _ waivers_ stall_ environmental-projects.html ("The volunteer Environmental 
Council suspended work last August, complaining, among other things, that the state was not 
providing it with adequate resources such as meeting rooms and staffsupport."). 
298 See, e.g., Senate Committee on Energy and Environment, Standing Committee Report 
No. 1276 on Governor's Message Nos. 547, 548, 550, 573, 609, 610, and 638, 2011 Sess. 
(Haw. 2011) (Environmental Council appointments), http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/ 
session2011lCommReportslGM550_SSCR1276_.HTM. 
299 Leo Azambuja, Hooser Appointed to Office of Environmental Quality Control, THE 
GARDEN ISLAND.COM, Feb. 8, 2011, available at http://thegardenisland.comlnews/local/govt-
and-politics/article _ge9362ac-3421-11 eO-803d-00 1 cc4c03286.html. 
300 See supra note 32. 
301 Turtle Bay, 123 Haw. at 174,231 P.3d at 447. 
302 Id. at 173-74,231 P.3d at 446-47. 
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arguments that either the thirty-day time limit of -7(b), which would have 
required that the DPP file a notice with OEQC ofa "negative declaration,,,303 or 
the sixty-day time limit of -7( c), for reviewing a decision to require an EIS, 
applied.304 The court also rejected the defendants' argument that the time 
frame ran from the date of the plaintiffs' "actual knowledge" of the DPP's 
decision not to require an SEIS.305 Because the plaintiffs had filed "well 
before" the 120-day period after the DPP' s formal decision, the lawsuit was not 
barred.306 
In short, Turtle Bay deserves to be among the ranks of ground-breaking 
chapter 343 cases like Kahana Sunset and Superferry I and II. The Hawai'i 
Supreme Court again united to strongly endorse the power ofthe chapter 343 
process and the beneficial role of citizens' groups. The court's endorsement for 
citizen particip~tion does, however, have sensible boundaries. 
III. BOUNDARIES: BALANCING THE BENEFITS OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
UNDER CHAPTER 343 AGAINST THE RISK OF NEW EXPANSES OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW 
Two of the Moon Court's environmental review decisions signal that, despite 
the string of resounding victories for environmental plaintiffs, the court has set 
boundaries on the reach of the fundamental public participation principles that 
support chapter 343. In Sierra Club v. Hawaii Tourism Authority and Nuuanu 
Valley Association v. City and County of Honolulu, the court looked over the 
precipice and declined to parachute into a world that might have allowed much 
wider application of chapter 343. Both cases provide citizens' groups, 
agencies, and developers a clearer picture of what chapter 343 litigation 
theories are less likely to succeed and, more importantly, how facts really do 
matter. 
A. HTA: Peering over the Procedural Standing Precipice 
In 2002, in Sierra Club v. Hawaii Tourism Authority (HTA),307 the Hawai'i 
Supreme Court issued a rare fractured opinion, cracking open the door for later 
adoption of procedural standing in Superferry I. The HTA case involved an 
innovative argument by the Sierra Club that a tourism marketing plan proposed 
303 A "negative declaration," meaning that the agency detennines that a full EIS is not 
required, is now called a "finding of no significant impact." HAw. REv. STAT. § 343-2 (2010). 
304 Turtle Bay, 123 Haw. at 173, 231 P.3d at 446. 
305 Id. at 174,231 P.3d at 447. 
306 Id. 
307 100 Haw. 242, 59 P.3d 877 (2002). 
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by the State required review under chapter 343.308 A two-justice plurality of 
the court rejected the Sierra Club's standing altogether-both on traditional and 
procedural injury grounds.309 A three-justice majority of the court supported 
the proposed "procedural injury" theory/IO but only two of them found that the 
Sierra Club met the standard in this case.311 The Sierra Club lost the battle but 
it would later win the war. 
In 1999, the Hawai' i Tourism Authority (HT A) drafted a strategic marketing 
plan for the State (Tourism Strategic Plan or TSP),312 held public meetings and 
received public input on the draft TSP,313 issued a request for proposals, 
selected the winning bidder, and signed the contract for $117 million in 
February 2000 with the Hawai'i Visitors and Convention Bureau? 14 Concerned 
about the impacts of bringing even more tourists to Hawai'i, in June 2000, the 
Sierra Club brought a chapter 343 lawsuit directly to the Hawai'i Supreme 
Court315 for failure to prepare an EA.316 
In their plurality decision, Justices Acoba and Ramil found that "[ w ]hile we 
are not unsympathetic to the concerns it raises," the Sierra Club did not meet 
the traditional three-part injury-in-fact test for standing to challenge HTA's 
tourism marketing plan for lack of an EA. 317 The plurality found that the Sierra 
Club: did not establish an actual or threatened injury as a result of the 
marketing services proposed by HTA; did not establish that the actual or 
308 [d. at 245,59 P.3d at 880. 
309 [d. (Justices Acoba and Ramil rejecting Sierra Club's standing). 
310 /d. at 265-66,275,59 P.3d at 900-01,910 (Chief Justice Moon and Justice Levinson 
supporting the "procedural injury" theory with Justice Nakayama concurring). 
311 [d. at 275-81,59 P.3d at 910-16 (Moon, C.J., dissenting). 
312 [d. at 245-46,59 P.3d at 880-81 (plurality opinion). 
313 [d. at 246,59 P.3d at 881. 
314 [d. at 247, 59 P.3d at 882. As the plurality noted, chapter 343 applies to use of state 
"funds" not just "lands" (the "language clearly indicates that HRS § 343-5(a)(I) applies to more 
than just land related matters"). [d. On the other hand, Justice Nakayama found the "use" 
trigger is restricted to land-related impacts: "It is clear that the legislature contemplated that the 
expenditure of funds must have a direct correlation to the use of lands designated in HRS §§ 
343-5(a)(2)-(8). Therefore, I would hold that HRS § 343-5(a)(I) does not support standing to 
challenge the failure to conduct an EA when a state or county agency simply expends funds. 
Rather, HRS § 343-5(a)(I) requires an EA for those projects that have a sufficient nexus to the 
purposes intended by the legislature in enacting HEPA." [d. at 270,59 P.3d at 905 (Nakayama, 
J., concurring). 
315 The lawsuit was brought under a special provision of the statute establishing the HTA 
(H.R.S. § 20lB-15). Id. at 247-48, 59 P.3d at 882-83 (plurality opinion). Note that the 
Legislature removed this direct appeal provision in the next legislative session. [d. at 247-48 
n.8, 59 P.3d at 882-83 n.8. 
316 HTA challenged the Sierra Club's standing in its answer to the complaint; in March 2000 
the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment on standing. [d. at 249-50, 59 P.3d at 
884-85. 
317 [d. at 245,59 P.3d at 880. 
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threatened injury would be fairly traceable to the expenditures; and did not 
show that such injury, if it occurred, would likely be remedied by a favorable 
judicial decision.318 The plurality also rejected the theory that "informational 
injury" is sufficient to confer standing319 and concluded that the Sierra Club 
had not established a procedural right to protect its interest and so could not 
rely on "procedural standing. ,,320 
The middle ground, later embraced by the court in Superferry I, was 
presented by Justice Nakayama. She adopted the Sierra Club's proposed 
procedural standing test, but agreed with the plurality that the Sierra Club did 
not meet that test because of the lack of correlation between the HTA plan and 
the Sierra Club's alleged adverse environmental effects.321 She first found that 
procedural standing is appropriate under chapter 343: "federal courts' 
construction of procedural standing is appropriate as applied to HEPA because, 
similar to its federal counterpart, NEP A, HEP A sets forth various requirements 
that are inherently procedural.,,322 She added: "Consequently, HEPA does not 
confer substantive rights or remedies. To insist that a prospective plaintiff 
demonstrate substantive standing pursuant to a statute that confers only 
procedural rights ignores the plain language ofHRS § 343-7(a).,,323 Therefore, 
the plaintiff should not have to meet the "normal standards for redressability 
and immediacy.,,324 
318 Id. The plurality found that the HTA program was designed to increase visitor spending 
not arrivals, and that the Sierra Club's affidavits lacked specific link to impacts from the HTA 
program as opposed to "general laments." Id. at 251, 59 P.3d at 886. The plurality 
distinguished other environmental cases where it found standing. Id. at 252-53, 59 P .3d at 887-
88. 
319 Id. at 257, 59 P .3d at 892. Justices Acoba and Ramil further noted that the issue was a 
matter of first impression, and they agreed with the D.C. Circuit 1991 Lyng decision that 
rejected informational standing in NEPA cases. Id. (citing Found. on Econ. Trends v. Lyng, 
943 F.2d 79 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). They also observed that the procedural standing issue had barely 
been raised in the briefs but had "been seized upon by the concurrence and dissent." Id. at 258, 
59 P.3d at 893. 
320 Id. at 245, 59 P.3d at 880. The court concluded: 
It is evident that the federal construct of a procedural right is not germane in this case 
because (I) HRS § 343-7, the Hawai'i statute at issue, establishes who and under what 
circumstances the lack of an EA, may be challenged, and (2) federal cases recognizing 
this standard are inapposite, as they rest on non-analogous statutes. Thus, Petitioner 
cannot be afforded so-called "procedural standing" under HRS § 343-7(a). 
Id. at 260, 59 P.3d at 895. However, the plurality did seem to bend backwards to declare its 
track record that it has consistently ruled in favor of standing of environmental plaintiffs, citing 
a string of pro-plaintiffs environmental cases. Id. at 256, 59 P.3d at 891. 
321 Id. at 265,59 P.3d at 900 (Nakayama, l, concurring). 
322 Id. at 266, 59 P .3d at 901. 
323 /d. at 267,59 P.3d at 902. 
324 Id. (citations omitted). 
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But Justice Nakayama concluded that the Sierra Club's case tripped up on 
the facts; it did not meet even that lower standard: "Sierra Club's allegation 
that it has a geographic nexus to various sites on the island that may be affected 
by increased visitor traffic as a result ofHT A's marketing plan is not sufficient 
to establish such a concrete interest in this case.,,325 The Sierra Club did not 
prove that "it has a concrete interest because the nexus between the HT A's 
proposed marketing plan and the alleged environmental effects is dependent 
upon the decisions of independent acts of prospective visitors. ,,326 With three 
justices holding "no standing," the Sierra Club lost the proverbial battle. 
Chief Justice Moon and Justice Steven Levinson dissented, finding that the 
procedural injury rule should be adopted by the court and that the Sierra Club 
met that test. As Chief Justice Moon explained: 
the plurality raises the standing hurdle higher than even the showing necessary 
for success on the merits of Sierra Club's claim, insofar as Sierra Club need show 
only that: (1) HT A was required to conduct an EA; (2) HT A failed to do so; and 
(3) as a result, Sierra Club's plaintiffmembers-not the environment-have been 
or will be harmed.327 
He reminded the plurality that the Hawai'i courts have liberally granted 
standing: "we have recently reiterated that, 'where the interests at stake are in 
the realm of environmental concerns, "we have not been inclined to foreclose 
challenges to administrative determinations through restrictive applications of 
standing requirements.",,,328 
Because the focus of chapter 343 is procedural, not substantive, 
any alleged injury resulting from HTA's purported failure to follow the 
provisions of chapter 343 is in the nature of a "procedural" injury. In other 
words, the alleged injury is that the agency acts without considering potentially 
"significant effects" of the environmental consequences of its actions, 
irrespective of whether there is actual environmental harm?29 
Chief Justice Moon drove home the point of chapter 343: "The failure to 
follow the applicable procedures increases the risk that significant 
environmental effects will be overlooked by the relevant decision-makers. The 
injury-the increased risk of significant environmental effects due to 
uninformed decision making-is precisely the type of injury that Chapter 343 
325 /d. at 269,59 P.3d at 903. 
326 /d. at 270-71,59 P.3d at 904-05. 
327 Id. at 271,59 P.3d at 906 (Moon, C.J., dissenting). 
328 Id. (quoting Citizens for the Prot. of the N. Kohala Coastline v. Cnty. ofHawai'i (North 
Kohala), 91 Haw. 94, 100-01,979 P.2d 1120, 1126-27 (1999) (quoting Mahuiki v. Planning 
Comm'n, 65 Haw. 506, 512, 654 P.2d 874,878 (1982))). 
329 Id. at 272,59 P.3d at 907. 
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was designed to prevent.,,330 Presaging its ground-breaking 2010 opinion in 
County ofHawai 'i v. Ala Loop Homeowners (Ala Loop),33! Chief Justice Moon 
then referenced a little-used provision in the Hawai' i constitution to support 
liberalized standing:332 
With respect to the legislative and constitutional declarations of policy relevant 
to Sierra Club's claim that the HT A failed to do an EA as required under HRS § 
343-5(b), article XI, section 9 of the Hawai'i Constitution states unambiguously 
that "each person has the right to a clean and healthful environment" and that 
"any person may enforce this right against any party, public or private, through 
appropriate legal proceedings, subject to reasonable limitations and regulation as 
provided by law." Moreover, the legislature has clearly declared the policy of 
this state with respect to the environmental review process in HRS § 343-1 
333 
In short, Chief Justice Moon strongly supported adopting the procedural 
standing test proposed by the Sierra Club,334 paving the way for the Superferry 
I and Ala Loop decisions. In almost summary fashion, he found that the Sierra 
Club affidavits met that new test. 335 
In summary, HTA counts as a temporary loss for environmental plaintiffs 
who might have reached too far with difficult facts given the diffuse nature of 
the marketing plan's harm. Skeptical of the long chain of causality between the 
HTA marketing plan and the plaintiffs injuries, the court pulled back. 
330 Id. at 276, 59 P.3d at 911. Contrary to the plurality'S view that HEPA standing is 
narrower than NEP A standing, id. at 261,59 P .3d at 986 (plurality opinion), according to Chief 
Justice Moon, "this court had also made it clear that its own standing requirements, particularly 
in the realm of environmental litigation, may be less stringent than the federal requirements." 
Id. at 276,59 P.3d at 911 (Moon, C.J., dissenting) (citing North Kohala, 91 Haw. at 100,979 
P.2d at 1126 (noting that "standing principles are governed by 'prudential' considerations.")). 
331 123 Haw. 391, 235 P.3d 1103 (2010). 
332 HTA, 100 Haw. at 276,59 P.3d at 911 (Moon, C.J., dissenting). 
333 Id. (quoting HAW. CONST., art. XI, § 9). 
334 The Moon/Levinson test stated: 
Consistent with the analogous federal law in this area, I would formulate the injury in fact 
test in this case as follows. First, Sierra Club must demonstrate that HTA failed to 
conduct an EA before undertaking its tourism marketing plan. Second, tracking the 
statutory purpose of an EA, Sierra Club must demonstrate that HTA's failure to conduct 
the EA resulted in an increased risk that its marketing plan may have a "significant effect" 
on environmental quality, as defined in HRS § 343-2. Third, in order to ensure that the 
injury is concrete and particularized, Sierra Club must show that the increased risk of a 
significant effect on environmental quality injures its members personally by 
demonstrating a "geographic nexus" between individual members and the site of the 
injury. Finally, Sierra Club's purported injury must be within the "zone of interests" 
sought to be protected by HEP A. 
Id. at 281,59 P.3d at 916. 
335 Id. at 285,59 P.3d at 920. 
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Ultimately, the court concluded that chapter 343 was not well suited to this 
particular factual claim, but the rulings of the majority adopting procedural 
standing came roaring back-to the Sierra Club's benefit-just a few years 
later in Supeiferry 1. 
B. Nuuanu Valley Association: Setting the Boundaries of the "Use" 
Trilogy 
In 2008, two years after Koa Ridge, Justice Nakayama wrote Nuuanu Valley 
Association v. City and County of Honolulu336 for a unanimous bench,337 
pulling the court back from the precipice of an unlimited definition of "use of 
state or county lands" that might have resulted from an extreme interpretation 
of the Kahana Sunset, North Kohala, and Koa Ridge trilogy. She held that a 
proposed connection to existing city drainage and sewage lines by the forty-five 
acre Laumaka subdivision in Nu'uanu Valley for nine residential lots on land 
zoned "residential" since 1943 did not constitute the "use" of state or county 
lands. 338 
The neighborhood controversy started in early 2005 when the non-profit 
Nuuanu Valley Association (NVA) expressed concern about the proposed 
development on the steep mountainside slopes of the valley. NY A asked to 
examine various reports in DPP's files related to the subdivision application of 
the prior owner, Pu 'u Paka DP LLC.339 DPP declined to provide the requested 
reports to NY A.340 DPP deferred the subdivision application and, after it 
expired, Pu'u Paka sold the property to Laumaka LLC, which proceeded with 
the subdivision plans.341 NY A again submitted a request for engineering 
reports related to the project.342 
After DPP initially declined to release a geotechnical report due to the 
deliberative process privilege, NY A notified DPP of its intent to sue?43 DDP 
then "accepted" the report and made it available to the public344 and released a 
requested drainage report.345 In May 2006, after the circuit court denied 
NY A's preliminary injunction request, DPP approved the tentative subdivision 
336 119 Haw. 90, 194 P.3d 531 (2008). 
337 Justice Acoba wrote a brief concurrence that emphasized the lack of showing by the 
plaintiff on "use," not differing significantly from the majority opinion. Id. at 107-08, 194 P.3d 
at 548 (Acoba, J., concurring). 






344 Id. at 94-95, 194 P.3d at 535-36. 
345 Id. at 95, 194 P.3d at 536. 
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for the parce1.346 One year later, after disposing of further motions, the circuit 
court entered final judgment against NY A on all counts, including that an EA 
was not required because there was no "use" of state or county lands.347 
On appeal, Justice Nakayama's decision primarily addressed the issues of 
public records and administrative law, ruling partially in favor of the 
plaintiff.348 With regard to chapter 343, Justice Nakayama examined the 
proj ect' s proposed connection to existing city drainage and sewer utilities and 
rejected the plaintiff's expansive position that chapter 343 applied "[ s]o long as 
there is a 'use' of city or state lands," without regard to "the size ofthe 'use' 
and comparisons to the scope and size of the overall project.,,349 Referring to, 
and circumscribing, the implications of the trilogy of Kahana Sunset,350 North 
Kohala, and Koa Ridge, Justice Nakayama emphasized the extensive nature of 
the tunneling or construction proposed in those cases and held they did not 
reach as far as the plaintiffs suggested.351 She stated: "This court has not held 
that merely connecting privately-owned drainage and sewage lines to a state or 
county-owned drainage and sewage system is sufficient to satisfy HEPA's 
requirement of 'use of state or county lands. ",352 Absent "tunneling or 
construction" of some significance, she concluded, there was no "use.,,353 
The court declined to apply the "ordinary meaning" of the word "use," which 
would have resulted in the state or county lands trigger being applied "no 
matter what or how benign that 'use may be. ",354 In her view, the Legislature 
did not intend such "countless possibilities of 'uses. ",355 "[D]rainage and 
sewer lines [that] merely connect" to existing utilities "without requiring 
346 Id. 
347 Id. at 95-96, 194 P.3d at 536-37. The case skipped the ICA when, at plaintiff's request, 
the Supreme Court transferred the case under Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 602-58(a)(l)-
(b)(l) on the basis that it raised an important or novel question. Id. at 96, 194 P.3d at 537. 
348 The court held that, prior to acceptance, the engineering report submitted by the 
developer to (and commented upon by) DPP was not a "public document," and therefore DPP 
did not need to release it to the public under the State Uniform Information Practices Act 
(UlPA). Id. at 96-98,194 P.3d at 537-39. The court did find, however, that DPP violated the 
Hawaii Administrative Procedure Act (HAPA), id. at 98-99, 194 P.3d at 539-40, when DPP 
"refus[ed] to make available to the public any unaccepted engineering reports and written 
comments thereon." Id. at 99-100,194 P.3d at 540-41. 
349 Id. at 101, 194 P.3d at 542. 
350 Justice Nakayama noted that the ''use'' of state or county lands in Kahana Sunset was 
"undisputed between the parties." Id. 
351 Id. at 101-02, 194 P.3d at 542-43. 
352 Id. at 103, 194 P.3d at 544 (emphasis added). See also id. at 103-04, 194 P.3d at 544-55 
(discussing the trilogy, again emphasizing the extent of the use). 
353 Id. at 103, 194 P .3d at 544. Justice Nakayama noted that the cases had "so far been 
limited to projects that require tunneling or construction beneath state or county land." Id. 
354 Id. 
355 Id. 
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construction or tunneling beneath state or county lands" did not trigger chapter 
343.356 The court further rejected the argument that a "slope stability analysis" 
performed on state forestry land above the subdivision was a "use," again citing 
the trilogy.357 It also declined to find that a Territory of Hawai'i-era hiking 
easement within the subdivision itself constituted a "use.,,358 
On the one hand, Nuuanu is a decision where the complaining homeowners 
lost. Even though the court viewed NVA's concerns about the risks of the 
subdivision as "understandable," the court viewed the plaintiff s view of "use" 
as too far to stretch the law, stating, "[W]e must remain mindful of our duties to 
follow the law.,,359 On the other hand, the court firmly reinforced its prior 
rulings in the Kahana Sunset trilogy that it meant what it said--chapter 343 
applied when the connections involved non-de minimis tunneling or 
construction on state or county lands. This ruling was bitter for the plaintiff but 
bittersweet for the broader environmental community. 
Like in HTA, where the causal chain was too attenuated in the court's view, a 
major factor that may have influenced the court's narrower view of Nuuanu 
was the smaller size of the proposed development. Unlike the large new 
development proposed in Kahana Sunset (312 multi-family units), North 
Kohala (387-acre resort plan), andKoa Ridge (1274-acre reclassification), the 
subdivision in Nuuanu involved nine lots (potentially eighteen homes) that the 
court noted had been zoned for residential use "since approximately 1943.,,360 
While not unsympathetic to the risks cited by the plaintiff,36! the court was 
unwilling to force development in an area zoned for residential development 
over sixty years ago through the chapter 343 process when, in the court's view, 
the factual connection was tenuous and the impact did not rise to the level that 
the Legislature had in mind for triggering environmental review. Thus, the top 
of the chapter 343 "use" funnel gained definite boundaries in the little-
acknowledged Nuuanu decision. 
356 Id. at 104,194 P.3d at 545. NV A argued that the connection did involve construction or 
tunneling, but had not provided sufficient support for that assertion to support reconsideration 
by the court. Id. at 104-05, 194 P.3d at 545-46. See also id. at 108, 194 P.3d at 548 (Acoba, J., 
concurring) ("[T]here was a lack of evidence as to whether the subdivision hookup to the sewer 
system would be constructed under state or county land."). 
357 Id. at 105, 194 P.3d at 546 (majority opinion). 
358 Id. 
359 Id. at 104, 194 P.3d at 545. 
360 Id. at 94, 102, 194 P.3d at 535, 543. 
361 Id. at 104, 194 P.3d at 545. 
2011 / THE MOON COURT'S ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW 629 
C. Harder Boundaries, When Quixotic Plaintiffs Lose: Price and Morimoto 
During the Moon era, the court handed losses to plaintiffs in only two 
environmental review decisions: Price v. Obayashi Hawaii Corp.362 and 
Morimoto v. Board of Land and Natural Resources.363 Even though these 
cases involved maj or controversial land developments-the Obayashi Corp. (or 
"Uhi Lani") project on the North Shore of O'ahu in the Price case, and the 
Saddle Road realignment on the island ofHawai'i in the Morimoto case-the 
court turned down the plaintiffs' request for more process in light of the 
extensive proceedings and reviews already vetted for the proposed 
developments. 
1 P · Q' . ''fl. k' ,,364? . nee: UlXotlC y-spec mg . 
The court's unanimous 1996 decision in Price, written by Justice Ramil, 
found that the plaintiff's request for additional environmental review under 
chapter 343 was unwarranted.365 After allowing Kamuela Price, an eccentric 
North Shore resident, to overcome the strict circuit court filing barriers and 
spending some time chastising the circuit court clerk's office,366 Justice Ramil 
began examining the court's decision on the merits of Price's chapter 343 claim 
by reviewing the fundamental goals of the EIS process.367 The fatal flaw in 
Price's case was his primary theory that "disagreement between experts" 
merited re-opening the FEIS.368 This theory is almost always a losing argument 
in the world of environmental review law when there is an extensive record of 
review and no glaring omissions or procedural errors. The court reasoned that 
the EIS process was not intended to resolve conflicting views but rather to 
"provide information to the deciding agency.,,369 The court concluded, 
362 81 Haw. 171,914 P.2d 1364 (1996). 
363 107 Haw. 296, 113 P .3d 172 (2005). 
364 See infra note 373 and accompanying text. 
365 The Hawai'i courts have made similar sufficiency findings in only two other cases. See 
Life of the Land v. Ariyoshi, 59 Haw. 156,577 P.2d 1116 (1978) (rejecting plaintiffs' request 
that the court enjoin construction of the Central Maui Water Transmission System due to an 
inadequate EIS, finding that the claim lacked support in the administrative record); Medeiros v. 
Hawaii Cnty. Planning Comm'n, 8 Haw. App.183, 797 P.2d 59 (I 990)(stating in dicta that an 
EA for a proposed geothermal research project did not need to analyze the impact of future 
geothermal energy businesses on the environment). 
366 Price, 81 Haw. at 179,914 P.2d at 1372. 
367 Id.atI80,914P.2dat1373. 
368 Id.atI81,914P.2dat1374. 
369 Id. (citing Anson v. Eastburn, 582 F. Supp. 18,24 (S.D. Ind. 1983)); see also id. at 181 
n.lO, 914 P.2d at 1374 n.IO (citing Residents in Protest-I-35E v. Dole, 583 F. Supp. 653,662 
(D. Minn. 1984) (stating that NEPA "does not require scientific unanimity")). 
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therefore, that the adequacy of an EIS was a question of law that could be 
"properly addressed through the summary judgment procedure.,,370 Applying 
the "rule of reason" standard of review for the adequacy of an EIS,371 the court 
slammed the door on Price's complaints.372 Justice Ramil concluded that the 
statute and administrative rules were designed "to give latitude" to the agencies 
about the details of the contents of the EIS document. 373 
Turning to Price's core argument, the court noted that he had challenged 
twelve different aspects of the EIS.374 The court emphasized the "breadth and 
depth" ofObayashi's EIS,375 listing the numerous topics covered376 and finding 
they were adequately covered in the EIS itself or through accompanying 
technical studies.377 Justice Rami! concluded that Obayashi's PElS-which the 
court specifically noted was more than 400 pages long and accompanied by 
370 Id. at 182,914 P.2d at 1375. 
371 Id (citingLifeoftheLandv. Ariyoshi, 59 Haw. 156, 164, 577P.2d 1116,1121 (1978)). 
372 Id. at 184,914 P.2d at 1377. Justice Ramil reiterated that an EIS: 
need not be exhaustive to the point of discussing all possible details bearing on the 
proposed action but will be upheld as adequate if it has compiled in good faith and sets 
forth sufficient information to enable the decision-maker to consider fully the 
environmental factors involved and to make a reasoned decision after balancing the risks 
of harm to the environment against the benefits to be derived from the proposed action, as 
well as to make a reasoned choice between alternatives. 
Id. at 182, 914 P.2d at 1375 (citingAriyoshi, 59 Haw. at 164,577 P.2d at 1121); see also id. at 
182 n.ll, 914 P.2d at 1375 n.ll (proposing that "it is not possible to draft an EIS that is perfect 
in all respects") (citing Envtl. De£ Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs of u.S. Army, 342 F. Supp. 
1211, 1217 (E.D. Ark. 1972)). Justice Ramil also noted the well-known 1982 decision by the 
u.s. District Court for the District ofHawai'i, Stop H-3 Association v. Lewis, 538 F. Supp. 149 
(D. Haw. 1982), where Judge Sam King found that the courts' role in reviewing a complete EIS 
was "very narrow." Id. at 182,914 P.2d at 1375. 
373 Id. at 183,914 P.2d at 1376. The court then mentioned a famous pro-defendant metaphor 
from a 1982 federal case, that courts are "not to 'fly speck' EISs." /d. at 182 n.12, 914 P.2d at 
1375 n.l2 (citing Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 695 (9th 
Cir. 1986) (citation omitted)). 
374 Id. at 183 n.l3, 914 P.2d at 1376 n.13. The court quickly stated that review would be 
limited under H.R.S. § 343-7(c) to the five concerns raised in his comments on the draft EIS. 
Id at 183,914 P.2d at 1376. 
375 Id. at 184 n.15, 914 P.2d at 1376 n.15. 
376 Id. On Price's first areas of concern, infrastructure and water supplies, the court noted 
that the EIS had "an entire section" on each of the topics of concern, where the issues were 
discussed "in detail" and that the FEIS had a "comprehensive discussion of traffic impacts." Id. 
at 184,914 P.2d at 1377. The court concluded on this issue that the EIS's discussion was "in 
good faith" and "sufficient." Id. at 184-85,914 P.2d at 1377-78. Price's concerns about the 
other issues-pesticideslherbicides, flooding/erosion, and Native Hawaiian archaeological 
sites-were also addresssed, in the view of the court. Id at 185, 914 P.2d at 1378. 
377 Id. at 183-85,914 P.2d at 1376-78. 
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twenty-four technical reports-supported the agency's recommendations and 
complied with H.R.S. chapter 343 and the administrative regulations.378 
In short, Price is the bookend example for the court's chapter 343 cases. 
The opinion provides a clear boundary to the court's willingness to step into the 
muck of an agency's decision-making process. It also signals that the uphill 
battle of challenging an FEIS can be very hard, particularly for an individual 
plaintiff like Price who had limited community support. Justice Ramil's 
reasoning further underscores the theme of this article that where the additional 
public process requested does not offer a substantial benefit, the court will take 
a dim view of the plaintiffs chapter 343 claims. Nine years later, the court 
reinforced this message in the Morimoto case. 
2. Morimoto: No match for a mountain of process 
In 2005, with Justice Acoba writing the unanimous opinion, the Moon Court 
reviewed similar issues to Price in a case that was not a straight chapter 343 
challenge but an attack on a state Conservation District Use Application 
(CDUA) for a federal highway project. In Morimoto, the court affirmed a 
Third Circuit Court judgment upholding BLNR approval of a DOT and Federal 
Highway Administration (FHA) application to use state conservation district 
land for the upgrade of Saddle Road on the Island of Hawai'i.379 Two 
individual plaintiffs, Daniel Morimoto, M.D. and Kats Yamada, were 
somewhat isolated voices in their challenge to the Saddle Road realignment.38o 
The selected federal-state alternative route (called PTA-1 )/81 which proposed 
to cross 206 acres of state conservation-zoned land, had undergone a full 
environmental review process, jointly undertaken by DOT and FHA in 
compliance with chapter 343 and NEP A. In addition, because of the seven 
endangered species impacted-including the litigation-famed Palila382_the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) had conducted a formal consultation 
378 Id. at 185,914 P.2d at 1378. The decision reflected the court's lack of empathy for Price 
on the merits, but the court did not throw this essentially pro se plaintiff under the bus. At the 
very end ofthe opinion, in response to Obayashi's request for sanctions against Price and his 
attorney, the court declined to entertain the request, finding that "Price presented a good faith, 
although unsuccessful, argument." Id. at 185 n.18, 914 P.2d at 1378 n.18. 
379 Morimoto v. Bd. of Land & Natural Res., 107 Haw. 296,297-98,113 P.3d 172, 173-74 
(2005). 
380 Vicky Mouze, Hawaii's PTA protects natural resources, WWW.ARMY.MIL: THE 
OFFICIAL HOMEPAGE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY (June 10,2010), http://www.army.miV-
news/20 1 0/06/1 0/40685-hawaiis-pta-protects-natural-resources/. 
381 Morimoto, 107 Haw. at 298, 113 P.3d at 174; National Environmental Policy Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(f) (2006). 
382 For a discussion ofthe litigation history ofthe Palila, see Oliver Houck, More Unfinished 
Stories: Lucas, Atlanta Coalition, and PalilaiSweet Home, 75 U. COLO. L. REv. 331 (2004). 
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with FHA under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act,383 resulting in a 
thorough Biological Opinion (BO).384 The BO called for the addition and 
restoration of lO,OOO acres of new habitat on Mauna Kea as mitigation for the 
loss of 100 acres ofPalila critical habitat, the relocation of the highway to avoid 
certain endangered plants, and other mitigation measures.385 In 1999, the FHA 
issued a Record of Decision (ROD) selecting PTA-l and legally binding the 
agency and the state DOT to implement the selected mitigation measures.386 Of 
particular importance to the court's ultimate view of the case, Justice Acoba 
noted that "[t]he mitigation plan in the ROD received wide support from 
scientific, regulatory agency, and environmental communities, and segments of 
the local community.,,387 
Justice Acoba explained that mitigation measures identified in the joint EIS 
must be considered by BLNR in its review of the CDUA.388 Similarly, the 
court dismissed the plaintiffs' other arguments about BLNR's failure to 
consider impacts on the Palila.389 In short, the court found that the EIS 
mitigation could be considered for the CDUA and that substantial evidence 
supported the BLNR's conclusion that the project would not cause substantial 
adverse effect of the natural resources of the area.390 
Although not a true chapter 343 case, Morimoto echoes many of the same 
themes underlying the court's decision in Price. The road to challenging an 
383 Morimoto, 107 Haw. at 299, 113 P.3d at 175. See also Endangered Species Act, 16 
U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006). 
384 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c) (requiring biological opinions). 
385 Morimoto, 107 Haw. at 299, 113 P.3d at 175. 
386 /d. at 299-300, 113 P.3d at 175-76. 
387 Id. at 300, 113 P.3d at 176. The court emphasized the extensive public review process 
undertaken before the BLNR approved the realignment. In April 2000, BLNR held a public 
hearing that turned into a contested case hearing, in which the plaintiffs participated. Id. In 
October 2001, BLNR issued the CDUP subject to certain conditions, including all of the 
conditions in the Final EIS. Id. When the plaintiffs appealed, the Third Circuit Court upheld 
the BLNR decision. Id. at 301,113 P.3d at 177. With those four strikes against them (similar 
to those in Price), Morimoto and Yamada, who were asking for further agency process on the 
mitigation, faced a skeptical Hawai'i Supreme Court. 
388 In fact, BLNR itself had expressly linked the two processes. Jd. at 303-04, 113 P.3d at 
179-80 (mitigation in an EA or EIS [is] an automatic condition ofa CDUP). Therefore, BLNR 
could consider those measures without the further rulemaking called for by the plaintiffs. Id. at 
304, 113 P.3d at 180. 
389 Id. at 304-06, 113 P.3d at 180-82. Justice Acoba found that the record supported the 
BLNR's finding that the endangered species ''would not suffer substantial adverse impact," 
noting the substantial mitigation measures adopted for Palila, including restoration of 10,000 
acres of "new" habitat. Id. at 308, 113 P.3d at 184. 
390 [d. at 308, 113 P.3d at 184. No Hawai'i judicial decision has yet addressed the more 
direct questions of concern to most stakeholders in cases like this, which are the specificity and 
enforceability of mitigation measures in an EIS. 
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agency's decision that is based on a full good-faith review process is 
treacherous. The joint federal-state EIS process, the completed federal Section 
7 process, and the extent of the· Palila mitigation in particular appeared quite 
damaging to Morimoto's and Yamada's prospects in challenging the 
downstream BLNR decision. Like Price, Morimoto presents a cautionary tale 
for future challenges to completed chapter 343 processes that appear to lack 
procedural flaws and are undergirded (as in Morimoto) by parallel agency 
examination of sensitive environmental issues. 
CONCLUSION 
This review of the chapter 343 cases decided during the Moon Court era 
indicate a consistent and strong commitment by the court to follow the 
Legislature's intent to support robust public participation in the environmental 
review process, even when that participation may disrupt some decisions of 
agencies and settled expectations of developers. Taken together, those cases 
form a remarkably uniform body of case law that strongly encourages citizens 
to resort to judicial review to ensure compliance with chapter 343. From the 
merits, to standing, to attorneys' fees, the Moon Court has cleared the judicial 
review pathway of the many obstacles that substantially impede almost all other 
kinds of state environmental litigation in Hawai 'i. 391 
The major exception to this otherwise well-fitted line through the Hawai'i 
Supreme Court's environmental review opinions since 1993 was the court's 
split decision in HTA.392 The court teetered at the edge of a sweeping pro-
environmental standing ruling but ended up badly fractured over whether to 
liberalize standing for environmental plaintiffs.393 Five years later, however, in 
Superferry 1,394 the court gave in to temptation and ruled wholeheartedly in 
favor of the Sierra Club on procedural standing. 
A key condition ofthe court's endorsement of public participation has also 
been its sotto voce concern that such participation will likely be "beneficial," 
even if it might be disruptive. In numerous decisions, such as the blockbusters 
Kahana Sunset, Superforry I and II, and Turtle Bay, the court required a fresh 
round of public process despite the protests of the county and state agencies 
who had prematurely approved the projects and despite developers' loud claims 
of adverse economic impacts and even takings.395 
391 In this author's experience, chapter 343 litigation in Hawai'i constitutes probably 
seventy-five percent of all filed and reported cases by citizens' groups. 
392 See Sierra Club v. Haw. Tourism Auth. (HTA), 100 Haw. 242, 59 P.3d 877 (2002). 
393 Id. 
394 Superferry 1,115 Haw. 299, 167 P.3d 292 (2007). 
395 Conversely, in the two cases where the citizen plaintiffs flat out lost, Price v. Obayashi 
Hawaii Corp., 81 Haw. 171,914 P.2d 1364 (1996), and Morimoto v. Board of Land & Natural 
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Perhaps the icing on the cake of the Moon Court's chapter 343 decisions is, 
ironically, a decision that did not involve chapter 343. In 2010, the Moon 
Court flung the courthouse doors open even more broadly for environmental 
citizens' groups in County of Hawai 'i v. Ala Loop Homeowners. 396 In that 
case, the majority enthusiastically embraced the Hawai'i State Constitution's 
provision in article XI, section 9 referring to a "clean and healthful 
environment" as conferring a broad private right of action for environmental 
wrongs.397 Ala Loop further reinforces the notion that the Moon Court has 
consistently supported the beneficial role of citizen-plaintiffs in Hawai' i 
environmental review specifically, and environmental cases generally. Given 
that the author of Ala Loop was current Chief Justice Recktenwald, who was 
appointed to the high seat by Governor Lingle, the judicial generosity toward 
citizen participation that was strongly reinforced by the Moon Court in the 
chapter 343 cases may well continue for the foreseeable future. 
Resources, 107 Haw. 296, 113 P.3d 172 (2005), the common thread ofthe court's treatment of 
the alleged chapter 343 violations seems to be that the quixotic individuals involved would not 
have brought beneficial light to the review process. In those cases, the court also seemed 
convinced that the agency or applicant had already extensively engaged the public in the 
environmental review process. 
396 123 Haw. 391, 235 P.3d 1103 (20iO)(finding that article XI, section 9 creates a private 
right of action to enforce a chapter 205 challenge to a proposed charter school and finding that 
the plaintiff homeowners' association had standing under the traditional injury-in-fact test). 
397 Id. at 425,235 P.3d at 1137. 
